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MONEY IS FOR NOTHING: THE INHERENT WANT OF
CONSIDERATION FOUND IN SUBSTANTIAL EXCLUSIVITY
TERMS WITHIN TRIBAL-STATE COMPACTS
Paul C. Alexander II*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most enduring misunderstandings within the
American public is that Indian gaming makes Native American
tribes instantly wealthy. Although the unemployment rate within
tribal communities is about 15%, 1 this statistic is not wholly
representative. Unemployment rates in some tribal communities
exceed 80%. 2 The myth of the wealthy Indian endures because
wealthier gaming tribes represent the exception rather than the
norm. Economically successful tribes, such as the Mashantucket
Pequot Tribe, the Mohegan Tribe, the Pechanga Band of Luiseño
Indians, and the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community, are the
faces of the myth and are unfortunately not the norm. 3 The reality,
*

J.D. Candidate, University of Idaho College of Law, Class of 2017; M.A. in
History, Southern Illinois University Carbondale, May 2013; Member of the
Ramapough Lenape Nation. The author would like to thank Dean Angelique
EagleWoman for her lessons and guidance during her time at the University of
Idaho College of Law and while this article was in its infancy. The author would
also like to thank Professor Gray H. Whaley for his lessons, guidance, and
patience, while the author finished his Masters study. The Author also would like
to thank all those who either read earlier versions of this article and provided
feedback or helped in other ways to make this article happen, including, but not
limited to: Professor Peter C. Alexander (a.k.a. Uncle Peter), Professor Robert
Williams, Jr., Travis Hartshorn, James Johnson, Annie Chaivre, and everyone else
who contributed during this process in one way or another. Finally, the author
would like to thank the AILJ editorial staff for their contributions and suggestions
during the editing process.
1
Dispelling the Myths About Indian Gaming, NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND
(Jan. 14, 2015), http://www. narf.org/indian-gaming/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2016).
2
Vincent Schilling, Getting Jobbed: 15 Tribes With Unemployment Rates Over
80 Percent, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Aug. 29, 2013),
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/08/29/danger-zone-15-tribesunemployment-rates-over-80-percent-151078 (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
3
See NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND, supra note 1. See also Mark Fogarty,
California Indian Gaming Reaches $7 Billion Again, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY
MEDIA NETWORK (Oct. 31, 2015),
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2015/10/31/california-indiangaming-reaches-7-billion-again-162240 (last visited Oct. 14, 2016). The
Mashantucket Pequot are located in Connecticut and own the Foxwoods Resort
Casino. The Mohegan Tribe is also located in Connecticut and own the
Mohegan Sun. The Pechanga Band of Luiseño Indians are located in California
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as of 2014, is that while the 459 Indian gaming facilities within the
United States generated over $28 billion dollars in gross revenues,
26 out of 566 federally recognized tribes produced 40.3% of the
revenue. 4 The remaining 540 tribes shared the remaining 59.7% of
revenue.
A second myth lies in the fundamental discrepancy of the
economic realities for gaming tribes; all gaming tribes enjoy all the
fruits of the gaming enterprises. This is false because of how the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA) has been
implemented in practice and construed by the United States
Supreme Court. 5 Under the IGRA, the state is able to receive a
percentage of net gaming revenue because any tribe that seeks to
pursue Las Vegas or Atlantic City style gaming must enter into a
tribal-state compact with a state. 6 This allows the state bordering the
reservation to secure for itself a substantial portion of net gaming
revenue before the tribe realizes its profit since the IGRA allows the
compact to include anything “directly related” to gaming. 7 Although
the IGRA initially required the states to negotiate compacts with
tribes in “good faith,” 8 the United States Supreme Court has
declared the means of enforcing the “good faith” requirement
unconstitutional. 9 Many states now use compacting to require that
tribes provide the state with a percentage of tribal gaming revenue
under the guise of revenue sharing agreements.
In the typical revenue sharing agreement, the state will promise
the tribe that it will not allow any form of gaming competition within
a defined area. This is commonly known as a “substantial
and own the Pechanga Resort and Casino. Finally, the Shakopee Mdewakanton
Sioux Community are located in Minnesota and own the Mystic Lake Casino.
4
Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services from the United
States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 81 Fed. Reg. 5019 (Jan. 29, 2016); 2014 Tribal
Gaming Revenues by Gaming Operation Revenue Range, NATIONAL INDIAN
GAMING COMMISSION (Jul. 8, 2015), www.nigc.gov/images/uploads/
reports/2014GGRbyGamingOperationRevenueRange.pdf (last visited Feb. 9,
2016).
5
25 U.S.C. § 2701–2721 (2012).
6
See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (2012).
7
Id. § 2710(d) (2012).
8
Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (2012).
9
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996) (overruling
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989)); see also 25 U.S.C. §
2710(d)(7)(A)(i) (providing a cause of action for Tribes in United States District
Court should a state refuse to negotiate a compact in good faith).
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exclusivity” agreement. The Department of the Interior consistently
interprets substantial exclusivity as one of the quite few “meaningful
concessions” a state can provide as consideration. 10 In 2004, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Interior, George Skibine, defined
“substantial exclusivity” as something that provides a quantifiable
economic benefit the state is not required to provide. 11 Such benefits
include, “exclusive rights to game on a geographical basis [or] to
tribes against non-Indian gaming. It also [can allow] the tribe to
game in a geographical area to the exclusion of other Indian
tribes.” 12 While substantial exclusivity is determined on a firstcome-first-serve basis, it tends to require a prohibition against nonIndian competition or fee relinquishment if the state allows nonIndian competition. 13 Consideration, however, is absent from
substantial exclusivity agreements in a tribal economic framework.
The state does not make a meaningful concession that accords with
kinship relations, good faith transactions, generosity, stewardship

10

Letter from Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior, to Gary E. Johnson,
Governor of New Mexico, (Aug. 23, 1997); See Letter from Kevin Washburn,
Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs, to Gary Besaw, Chairman, Menominee
Indian Tribe of Wisconsin (Mar. 12, 2015) (denying Tribal-State compact
between Menominee and Wisconsin); Letter from Kevin Washburn, Assistant
Secretary of Indian Affairs, to Deval Patrick, Governor of Connecticut (Oct. 12,
2012) (denying Tribal-State compact between the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe
and Connecticut); see also Kevin Gover & Tom Gede, The States As
Trespassers in a Federal-Tribal Relationship: A Historical Critique of TribalState Compacting Under IGRA, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 185, 211 (2010). On occasion,
the Department of the Interior will consider a package deal including substantial
exclusivity and other benefits to satisfy the meaningful concession requirement.
Such circumstances typically depend on the percentage of net revenue the
revenue sharing agreement calls for. See infra Part V.C.
11
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Amendments: Hearing on S. 1529 Before the
Comm. on Indian Affair, 108th Cong. 108-475, 33–36 (2004); see also Matthew
L.M. Fletcher, Bringing Balance to Indian Gaming, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 39,
75 n. 243 (2007) (providing older interpretations of the meaning of “substantial
exclusivity”).
12
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Amendments: Hearing on S. 1529 Before the
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. 108-475, 33–36 (2004) (statement of
George Skibine, acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Policy and Economic
Development, Dep’t of the Interior).
13
Press Release, Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior, Statement on the New
Mexico Gaming Compacts (Aug. 23, 1997),
https://web.archive.org/web/20071031090013/http://www.doi.gov/news/archive
s/indnmcom.html.
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and protection of resources, and interdependence with all living
creatures. 14
At a basic level, the IGRA clashes with tribal economics because
it stipulates how tribes can use gaming revenue. This denies inherent
tribal sovereignty because a tribe cannot fully define how it can use
gaming revenue for tribal betterment. 15 An ostensible argument
exists that Congress acted pursuant to its trust responsibility through
this infringement on tribal sovereignty. However, that argument is
weak. In reality, the tribal-state compact breaches trust because
revenue sharing agreements allow the state to secure a percentage of
net gaming revenue before the tribe can allocate revenue for tribal
betterment or distribute per capita payments to tribal members. 16
Trust is further violated because tribes are unable to define surplus
revenue and cannot provide for the tribal community before gifting
revenue to the state. To put it bluntly, the IGRA’s mechanism that
allows the state to take a cut of gaming revenue before the tribe
actually realizes gaming revenue is a failure by the United States to
ensure that tribal needs are met.
Revenue sharing for substantial exclusivity agreements
represents a failure by the United States because states are not
negotiating in good faith. Compacts are typically devoid of the
proper consideration necessary within a tribal economy. Want of
consideration exists because the tribe must promise to provide the
state a percentage of net revenue to begin compact negotiations. For
tribal economics, the tribe loses the ability to define surplus revenue
to contribute as a gift and forces the tribe to provide to the state
before its own members. Tribal members are provided for last.
14

See Angelique A. EagleWoman, Tribal Nation Economics: Rebuilding
Commercial Prosperity in Spite of U.S. Trade Restraints – Recommendations for
Economic Revitalization in Indian Country, 44 TULSA L. REV. 383, 384–5
(2008) [hereinafter EagleWoman, Tribal Nation Economics]; see also Angelique
EagleWoman, Tribal Nations and Tribalist Economics: The Historical and
Contemporary Impacts of Intergenerational Material Poverty and Cultural
Wealth Within the United States, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 805, 836 (2010)
[hereinafter EagleWoman, Tribal Nations and Tribalist Economics].
15
25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B) (2012); see also EagleWoman, Tribal Nation
Economics, supra note 14, at 408–9. Under the IGRA, tribes are limited to using
net gaming revenue to fund tribal government or programs, the general welfare
for the tribe, reinvestment for further economic development, donations, or to
fund local government agencies.
16
See, e.g., infra Part V.C.
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To show that substantial exclusivity arrangements do not
provide consideration in a tribal economy, this article will first
discuss what tribes expected from the IGRA. This will explain tribal
economics and survey the political battle antecedent to the IGRA
passage in 1988 where states attempted to regulate and tax tribal
economic enterprises. Also to be discussed is the IGRA statutory
requirements and what the tribal expectations were from the IGRA.
Second, this article discusses initial challenges by both states and
tribes after the IGRA’s passage and the seminal case Seminole Tribe
of Florida v. Florida where the Supreme Court declared the IGRA’s
enforcement
mechanism
for
good
faith
negotiations
unconstitutional. Third, this article transitions to discuss the absence
of tribal economics in revenue sharing agreements. This is done
through explaining what the Secretary deems a meaningful
concession, how the Seminole decision forces tribes to submit to
state demands for revenue sharing to begin compact negotiations,
and how courts refuse to amend bad faith compacts. Fourth, this
article demonstrates how consideration is wanting in substantial
exclusivity provisions because gaming provides inherent economic
benefits. Consideration is also wanting because substantial
exclusivity is illusory. To demonstrate that consideration is wanting
in a tribal economic model, this article analyzes practices employed
by New York, Oklahoma, California, and Idaho. Finally, this article
proposes recommendations to provide adequate consideration for
substantial exclusivity arrangements in a tribal economic model.
Needless to say, all parties need to change their course of dealing
with each other to achieve this goal.
II. TRIBAL EXPECTATION OF THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY
ACT
A. Fleshing Out Tribal Economics
Despite holding the power to deny compacts that violate the trust
relationship, the Secretary approves revenue sharing for substantial
exclusivity agreements that violate the trust relationship. Trust is
violated because the compacting requirement forces the tribes and
state to engage in a form of “cooperative federalism” that rejects
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tribal economics. 17 The IGRA is unique in that it attempts to pursue
cooperative federalism through an attempt to balance tribal and state
interests. 18 Congress attempted to ensure this occurred through the
requirement that states negotiate in good faith and the provision
allowing a cause of action for tribes should a state fail to do so. 19 In
Seminole Tribe, however, the United States Supreme Court held that
the enforcement mechanism to ensure good faith negotiations was
unconstitutional. 20 This has allowed states to reject traditional forms
of tribal economics that focus on the whole community and maintain
an individualistic mentality that attempts to undermine tribal
sovereignty at the bargaining table. This strains self-determination
because tribes are constricted to the state’s economic model for
negotiations and are unable to engage in tribal economics at the
bargaining table. 21 Tribes are unable to maintain balance in their
interactions and use of their resources as tribal economics demand
because states often require tribes to agree to revenue sharing as a
condition precedent to compacting. 22
A fundamental conflict exists between tribal economics and
American capitalism. While profits and reinvestment drive
capitalism, tribal economics depends on kinship relations, good faith
dealings, and gift giving within the tribal community and
neighboring communities. 23 Unlike capitalism, tribal economics
considers the community and not the individual as the economic
unit. Individuals gain independence through the ability to provide

17

Compare Artichoke Joe’s v. Norton, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1092 (E.D. Cal.
2002) aff’d sub nom Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 278 F. Supp.
2d 1174 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (stating that the “IGRA is an example of ‘cooperative
federalism’ in that it seeks to balance the competing sovereign interests of the
federal government, state governments, and Indian tribes, by giving each a role
in the regulatory scheme.”); with Alex Tallchief Skibine, Indian Gaming and
Cooperative Federalism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 253 (2010) (discussing how
cooperative federalism under the IGRA should be a cooperative tri-federalism –
that includes the United States, state governments, and tribes each as sovereigns
– that transitions from the trust relationship between the tribes and the United
States).
18
Skibine, Indian Gaming and Cooperative Federalism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 253,
253 (2010).
19
25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(3)(A), (d)(7)(A) (2012).
20
See infra Part III.
21
Gover & Gede, supra note 10, at 214; see also sources cited infra note 88.
22
EagleWoman, Tribal Nations and Tribalist Economics, supra note 14, at 836.
23
Id. at 806–07.
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not only for themselves, but also for the whole community. 24 Status
is then demonstrated by tribal members through gifts, feasts, and
surplus trade within the tribe and the surrounding community. 25
Through this economic system, the tribe stewards all resources by
first rationing out what is needed, and only then do surplus resources
become commercial commodities for gifts or trade throughout the
kinship network. 26 This ensures that the tribe minimizes excess
taking of all resources and ensures fair dealings throughout the
kinship network. 27 The tribe maintains a balance in commercial
transactions by stewarding resources, providing for the community,
and using the surplus to maintain kinship relations. 28 The interaction
between the tribes and the United States, based on this system of
exchange, has been stated as the linking of arms between brothers. 29
B. The Political Battle Between Tribes and States Before the IGRA
The IGRA was Congress’s answer to tension between Indian
gaming and Public Law 280. In 1953, Congress passed Public Law
280 to delegate criminal and civil jurisdiction over tribes to
California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. 30 Public
Law 280 also allowed all other states to voluntarily assume both
civil and criminal jurisdiction over tribes within their jurisdiction.31
The grant of civil jurisdiction was only “over private civil litigation

24

Id. at 807–08.
Id. at 806–08.
26
Id. at 806–08, 836-37.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 836.
29
See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER:
AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600-1800 (1997)
(discussing how during the 17th and 18th centuries western individuals had to
cooperate with tribes as equals for survival and how constructions of laws and
treaties during that time should reflect that).
30
Public Law 280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, 588-89 (1953) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010), and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 & note
(2006)). Upon receiving statehood, Alaska was added as the sixth mandatory
Public Law 280 state. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2012).
31
Public Law 280, ch. 505, at § 7, 590.
25
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involving reservation Indians.” 32 This does not include jurisdiction
over “general civil regulatory powers, including taxation.” 33
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, tribes began turning to bingo
for economic development. Almost immediately, states sought to
curtail tribal bingo and subject it to state regulation. The Fifth
Circuit in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth first addressed
whether a state that voluntarily assumed jurisdiction through Public
Law 280 could regulate tribal bingo. 34 There, Florida voluntarily
assumed both civil and criminal jurisdiction over tribes to the fullest
extent of the law, and it regulated bingo by non-tribal
organizations. 35 However, the Seminole Tribe sought to engage in a
profit-sharing agreement with a third party who would build and
manage a bingo hall for the tribe. 36 Broward County, Florida sought
to prevent the profit sharing agreement through Florida’s statutory
regulations. 37 The court determined that Broward County exceeded
Public Law 280’s grant of civil jurisdiction because Florida allowed
bingo. 38
The second major case regarding tribal gaming before the IGRA
was California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians. 39 In Cabazon,
California, a mandatory Public Law 280 state, sought to impose state
law to the Cabazon Band’s gaming operation. The State also tried to
force the Tribe to keep profits in “special accounts” and use profits
only for charitable purposes. 40 Riverside County, California also
sought to subject the Tribe to ordinances prohibiting poker and other
card games. 41 To put it differently, California sought to stymie the
Cabazon Band’s economic development by limiting the Tribe’s use
of gaming profits and preventing tribal members from benefiting.
California argued that although it allowed bingo and other forms of
gambling, there was a public need to regulate high-stakes bingo to
32

Bryan v. Itasca Cty., Minn., 426 U.S. 373, 385 (1976).
Id. at 390. This determination as to the bounds of Public Law 280’s grant of
civil jurisdiction has been defined as the “civil-regulatory” test.
34
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 312–315 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied 455 U.S. 1020 (1982).
35
Id. at 311, 313.
36
Id. at 311.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 314–15.
39
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
40
Id. at 205.
41
Id. at 206.
33
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prevent organized crime. 42 The United States Supreme Court
rejected California’s argument because California allowed gaming
within its borders and its attempt to police the Cabazon Band’s
gaming was regulatory under Public Law 280. 43
The Cabazon Court also answered whether a state could prevent
tribes from making high-stakes bingo available to non-Indians who
live off the reservation. 44 The Court balanced the federal interest of
allowing tribes to pursue “tribal self-sufficiency and economic
development” with the state interest in establishing law and
regulations for its residents. 45 The Court understood the significance
of gaming to the Cabazon Band’s economy because the Tribe lacked
natural resources. 46 Through the balancing test, the Court
determined that while California may have had “a legitimate
concern” about organized crime, federal policy trumped the State’s
interest because the gaming enterprise was critical for the Tribe to
realize economic self-determination. 47
While the battles over regulating tribal gaming occurred, states
and tribes also battled over whether a state can tax tribal enterprises
on trust land to gain a cut of tribal revenue. Shortly after Cabazon,
the Supreme Court in Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana affirmed
the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of a state tax on tribal coal mining on
both reservation and “ceded land” because Montana did not have a
legitimate interest. 48 There, Montana sought to tax coal extracted
from a “ceded area” of land that Congress required the Crow to
handover to the United States in 1904. 49 Although non-Indians
gained ninety eight percent of the area, the Tribe started a coal
mining enterprise after regaining ownership of the remaining two
percent through the Indian Restoration Act of 1958. 50 Montana then
imposed a severance tax that varied from three to thirty percent and

42

Id. at 211.
Id.
44
Id. at 216.
45
Id. The State’s position was based on its ability to receive taxes from tribes
stemming from transactions made by non-members on reservation lands.
46
Id. at 218–221.
47
Id.
48
Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 1987), aff’d
484 U.S. 997 (1988).
49
Id. at 896.
50
Id. at 896–97.
43
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a gross proceeds tax on each person who mined coal. 51 Through the
Cabazon balancing test, the Court found that coal production was
vital to the Crow’s economic development because coal leases
“generate funds for essential Tribal service and provide employment
for Tribal members.” 52 The Court held that Montana’s taxation
attempt to receive a portion of Crow’s revenue was not narrowly
tailored enough to override the federal policy of tribal selfdetermination. 53
Butterworth, Cabazon, and Crow Tribe set the stage for the
IGRA. States had made it clear that they wanted to regulate tribal
gaming, define what a tribe can do with gaming revenue, and take a
share of tribal gaming revenue. Yet the courts acted as the tribes’
brother and prevented states from acting in bad faith to pirate from
and control tribal economies. In 1988, Congress addressed the
conflict between the states’ desire to regulate tribal gaming and the
federal policy of tribal self-determination through the IGRA. 54
Unfortunately for tribes, the IGRA provided the states the
mechanism necessary to regulate economic development and gain a
share of tribal revenue. Congress did not provide a method for the
tribes to assist states through surplus capital; it appeased its
demanding children at the expense of its tribal brethren.
C. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988
Congress made it obvious that the IGRA was a response to
Cabazon. At first glance, the IGRA seeks to provide statutory
guidance for gaming to promote “tribal economic development,
self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments” through gaming. 55
However, the direct response to Cabazon is that the IGRA seeks:
to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of
gaming by an Indian tribe adequate to shield it from
organized crime and other corrupting influences, to
ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary
51

Id.
Id. at 901 (quoting California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S.
202, 220 (1987)).
53
Id. at 902.
54
25 U.S.C. § 2701(3)-(4) (2012).
55
Id. § 2702(1).
52
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of the gaming operation, and to assure that gaming is
conducted fairly and honestly by both the operator
and players. 56
The IGRA’s compact requirement extended Public Law 280’s
reach into Class II and Class III gaming for non-Public Law 280
States since all states must either allow tribes to conduct gaming
within its borders or completely prohibit its citizens from gaming. 57
Congress created the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC)
to regulate Indian gaming, ensure congressional policy is met, and
“to protect such gaming as a means of generating tribal revenue.” 58
The Chairman of the NIGC is tasked with approving relevant tribal
ordinances or resolutions for Class II or Class III gaming. 59
The IGRA charges the Secretary of Interior with approving
tribal-state compacts required for Class III gaming. 60 Although the
“good faith” negotiation requirement’s enforcement process has
been abrogated by the Supreme Court, 61 the Secretary fulfills his
duties through the review of compacts to ensure that the State does
not impose “any tax, fee, charge, or other assessment” onto the
tribe. 62 Only if a compact violates the IGRA, federal law, or “the
trust obligations of the United States to Indians” can the Secretary
disapprove a compact. 63
The IGRA divides Indian gaming into three separate classes
with statutorily defined characteristics, restrictions, and
requirements. First, Class I gaming consists of “social games solely
for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming . .
. as a part of, or in connection with, tribal ceremonies or

56

Id. § 2702(2).
See generally Jacob Berman, Such Gaming Causes Trouble: Constitutional
and Statutory Confusion with the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 23 SETON
HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 281, 283 (2013); Kathryn R.L. Rand, Caught in the
Middle: How State Politics, State Law, and State Courts Constrain Tribal
Influence over Indian Gaming, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 971, 976–77 (2007).
58
25 U.S.C. § 2702(3); see also 25 U.S.C. § 2704.
59
Id. § 2705(3)–(4).
60
Id. § 2710(d)(8)(i)–(iii).
61
Compare 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (2012); with infra Part III (discussing
how the United States Supreme Court determined § 2710(d)(3)(A)
unconstitutional and the ramifications of that holding).
62
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)–(4) (2012).
63
Id. § 2710(d)(8)(B).
57
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celebrations.” 64 Congress expressly excluded Class I gaming from
the IGRA’s statutory reach and placed it “within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Indian tribes.” 65
Second, games classified as Class II include “game[s] of
chance” like bingo for monetary or other prizes “in which the game
is won by the first person covering a previously designated
arrangement of numbers or designations on such cards.” 66 If a State
allows or does not expressly prohibit card games, those games are
also considered Class II games. 67 To conduct Class II gaming for
economic development, the tribe must be located in a state “that
permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization or
entity.” 68 The NIGC Chairman must also approve a tribal
“ordinance or resolution” that allows the gaming on Indian lands. 69
Finally, the IGRA defines Class III gaming as “all forms of
gaming that are not class I gaming or class II gaming.” 70 The most
common forms of Class III games are those typically seen in Las
Vegas or Atlantic City such as slots, poker, craps, blackjack, and
roulette. To conduct Class III gaming for economic development,
the tribe must meet the requirements to pursue Class II gaming. 71
The tribe must also request the bordering state to enter into tribalstate compact negotiations. 72 If that state allows the tribe to pursue
Class III gaming by agreeing on a compact, the tribe must conduct
the gaming enterprise “in conformance with [the] tribal-state
compact.” 73

64
Id. § 2703(6) (2012). Examples of Class I games include archery, dice and
shell games, and races. STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT & KATHRYN R.L. RAND, INDIAN
GAMING AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE CASINO COMPROMISE 39 (2005).
65
25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) (2012).
66
Id. § 2703(7)(A)(i)(I)–(III).
67
Id. § 2703(7)(A)(ii)(I)–(II).
68
Id. § 2710(b)(1)(A).
69
Id. § 2710(b)(1)(B).
70
Id. § 2703(8). Colloquially, Class III gaming is known as Las Vegas or
Atlantic City style gaming and includes slot machines and banking card games
typically seen in modern casinos. See id. § 2703(7)(ii)(B).
71
Id. § 2710 (d)(1)(A)–(C).
72
Id. § 2710 (d)(3)(A).
73
Id. § 2710(d)(1)(B)–(C).
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The IGRA originally required the state to “negotiate with the
Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a compact.” 74 Compacts
can contain agreements for: 1) civil and criminal jurisdiction for
licensing and regulation; 2) criminal and civil jurisdiction for
enforcement of laws and regulations; 3) costs to the state for
regulation; 4) taxation of the tribe; 5) remedies for breach of
contract; 6) standards operation and maintenance; and, 7) anything
else directly related to gaming operations. 75 Despite the vast scope
of what a compact can entail, any assessment cannot “tax, fee, [or]
charge” the tribe. 76 After compact negotiations finish, the Secretary
can deny compacts if he determines the compact violates the IGRA,
Federal law not related to Indian gaming jurisdiction, or the trust
relationship between the Tribe and the United States. 77
The IGRA provided tribes a cause of action in any United States
district court for a state’s failure to enter into compact negotiations
or refusal to negotiate in good faith. 78 Before filing an action to
compel negotiations, the tribe was required to provide the state with
180 days to enter negotiations. 79 After this period expired, the tribe
then had to show the court that a compact had not been agreed upon
and that the state did not respond to the request to negotiate or did
not respond to the request in good faith. 80 The state bore the burden
to prove good faith negotiations and if the court found the state
failed to negotiate in good faith, the court then ordered that a
compact be agreed upon within 60 days. 81 Should the tribe and state
fail to fulfill the court order, each party then provided a courtappointed mediator a proposed compact. 82 The mediator chose the
best compact and submitted it to the tribe and the state. 83 Upon
receipt of the mediator’s decision, the state had 60 days to accept or

74

Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A). The enforcement process, through federal courts, of the
requirement that the State negotiate in good faith has been deemed
unconstitutional. See infra Part III.
75
Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(i)–(vii) (2012).
76
Id. § 2710(d)(4).
77
Id. § 2710(d)(8)(B)(i)–(iii).
78
Id. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) (2012).
79
Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(i).
80
Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii)(I)–(II).
81
Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii)–(iii).
82
Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv).
83
Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv)–(v).
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deny the decision. 84 If the state agreed, then the compact would be
submitted to the Secretary for further review. 85 If not, then the
Secretary promulgated procedures, with the Tribe’s assistance, that
defined the Tribe’s Class III gaming opportunities consistent with
the mediator’s chosen compact and the state’s law. 86
D. What Indian Gaming Intended to Provide Tribes
Congress passed the IGRA in 1988 to “promote tribal economic
development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal
government.” 87 Congress recognized the persistent economic
depression that plagues many reservations and intended for the
IGRA to be a remedy. To put it differently, the IGRA is
representative of the trust relationship between tribal nations and the
United States based on historical kinship ties. 88 The IGRA was an
opportunity for tribes to achieve tribal self-sufficiency and to return
to a state of prosperity enjoyed before European contact. 89
Although clearly an attempt to promote tribal selfdetermination, Congress limited tribal inherent sovereignty. Under
the IGRA, tribes are only granted the “exclusive right to regulate
gaming activity on Indian lands” if that land is in a state that “does
not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such
gaming activity.” 90 It is arguable that the IGRA intended to elevate
tribal sovereignty to that of the bordering state and thus acted in
good faith. The further erosion of tribal inherent sovereignty shows

84

Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vi)–(vii).
Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vi).
86
Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii).
87
Id. § 2701(4) (2012).
88
The Supreme Court considers the trust relationship as one of a guardian-ward
relationship. The tribes are considered wards of the United States and the United
States acts as the tribes’ guardian, burdened with the “responsibility to protect or
enhance tribal assets.” DAVID WILKINS AND TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN
GROUND: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW 65 (2001); see
also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.04[3][a] (2012) (discussing the historical development
of the trust doctrine).
89
See EagleWoman, Tribal Nations and Tribalist Economics, supra note 14, at
838.
90
25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) (2012).
85
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the falsity of that argument because tribes are extraconstitutional
and are not bound by federal law. 91
Tribes are extraconstitutional because they did not participate in
the Constitutional Conventions and retain all sovereign rights not
surrendered to the United States. 92 Constitutional constraints do not
apply to tribes, and their sovereignty is guaranteed by treaties that
oblige the United States to protect Indian land from confiscation,
“preserve tribal hunting, fishing, and usufructuary rights,” maintain
tribal trust property, and provide specialized government services to
tribes. 93 Although tribes are extraconstitutional, the forced
bargaining partner, the states, are bound by the Constitution and can
have their rights enforced in United States District Court. Tribes do
not have this liberty and have no recourse in Court absent
congressional action. 94 The IGRA did provide tribes a cause of
action in the event states refused to negotiate in good faith.
However, judicial action soon caused this enforcement mechanism
to be deemed unconstitutional because it violated state
sovereignty. 95 States have seized on this declaration to refuse to
negotiate in good faith and force tribes to submit to revenue sharing
agreements.
III. EARLY CHALLENGES TO THE IGRA AND THE END OF GOOD
FAITH
Both tribes and states responded to the IGRA’s compact
requirement with discord. Tribes found the compacting requirement
an infringement on their sovereignty. States still wanted the ability
to regulate and control tribal gaming and not be forced to negotiate
in good faith. As demonstrated below, however, the Court in
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida declared the IGRA’s
91

See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384–85 (1896) (holding aspects of
inherent tribal sovereignty not abrogated by Congress’s plenary authority over
tribes are not subject to the United States Constitution).
92
Carol Tebben, An American Trifederalism Based Upon the Constitutional
Status of Tribal Nations, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 318, 324 (2003).
93
Hope Babcock, A Possible Solution to the Problem of Diminishing Tribal
Sovereignty, 90 N.D. L. REV. 13, 26-27 (2014); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Retiring
the “Deadliest Enemies” Model of Tribal-State Relations, 43 TULSA L. REV. 73,
76 (2007).
94
See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1, 20 (1831).
95
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996).
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enforcement process to ensure good faith negotiations
unconstitutional. 96 The Secretary and some courts have tried to
provide tribes remedies if a state refuses to negotiate in good faith. 97
Yet, the reactionary measures taken have not gone far enough as
they allow states to take a substantial amount of gaming net revenues
through revenue sharing agreements.
The Red Lake Band of Chippewa asserted to the court that the
IGRA’s compact requirement exceeded Congress’s plenary power
over tribes. To do so, the tribe argued that the IGRA violated: (1)
their right to self-determination preserved in treaty rights, federal
law, and inherent sovereignty; (2) the trust relationship; and, (3)
their right to self-government in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 98
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
determined that the tribe suffered no injury because Congress has
“virtually unlimited power over the Indian tribes” and “tribal
sovereignty is but a stick in front of a tank.” 99 The court also
determined that Congress acted pursuant to the trust relationship and
ruled against the Tribe’s Fifth Amendment due process claim
because Congress “could reasonably address the concern of
infiltration of organized crime into Indian gaming.” 100 The court
upheld the compact requirement and appeased the states at the
Tribe’s expense. This further eroded the relationship between tribes
and the states who are seen as the United States’ children by tribes.
Many states also did not see the need to negotiate in good faith
with tribes. In early challenges, courts did require states to negotiate
in good faith as demanded by the IGRA. For example, Connecticut
refused to enter compact negotiations with the Mashantucket Pequot
Tribe despite the State allowing “Las Vegas nights” with games of
chance. 101 The Second Circuit found that the Tribe requested the

96

Id. at 57.
See 25 C.F.R. § 291 (1999).
98
Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Swimmer, 740 F. Supp. 9, 10 (D.D.C.
1990). The Tribe also argued that the IGRA unconstitutionally restricted the
powers of federal courts. Id.
99
Id. at 11 (quoting Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 687 F.
Supp. 1380, 1392 (D. Alaska 1988)).
100
Id. at 16.
101
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1027 (2d. Cir.
1990).
97
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State to enter compact negotiations. 102 This required Connecticut to
negotiate with the Tribe for the same games allowed at “Las Vegas
nights” because the State did not completely prohibit those
games. 103 Negotiations did “not necessarily [subject the Tribe] to
the entire State law on gaming.” 104
Despite being forced to abandon traditional kinship trade with
the United States, tribes maintained faith that the courts would
continue to force the states to negotiate in good faith. This did not
happen and the predetermined trade partner, the states, continued to
reject good faith negotiations. Despite the United States’
responsibility to preserve tribal economics as part of its trust
responsibility, many courts determined that the IGRA’s good faith
requirement violated state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment of the United States Constitution.105 These courts
viewed the compacting requirement not as a demand but as a
“discretionary act.” 106 A circuit split arose that forced the United
States Supreme Court to answer the question once and for all.107
Unfortunately for tribes, the Court determined that although the
IGRA required a tribal-state compact for Class III gaming, the state
could not be forced to negotiate and eliminated the IGRA’s
enforcement mechanism for good faith negotiations. 108
In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Court determined
that the Seminole Tribe could not compel specific performance due
to Florida’s refusal to enter good faith negotiations with the Tribe. 109
The Court acknowledged that “Congress clearly intended to
102

Id. at 1028–29.
Id. at 1029.
104
United States v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, 897 F.2d 358, 366 n. 10
(8th Cir. 1990).
105
See Ponca Tribe of Okla. v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1436–37 (10th Cir.
1994) cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom, Oklahoma v. Ponca Tribe of
Okla., 517 U.S. 1129 (1996); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida., 11 F.3d 1016,
1028 (11th Cir. 1994), aff’d sub nom, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996) (both courts determined that the Ex parte Young doctrine is not
applicable to the “good faith” requirement because the state was the interested
party, not an arm of the state).
106
Ponca Tribe of Okla., 37 F.3d at 1437.
107
See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1990)
(holding that Connecticut had to enter compact negotiations after the
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe requested that negotiations occur).
108
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996).
109
Id. at 76.
103
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abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity through [the good faith
requirement in] § 2710(d)(7).” 110 The Court also reaffirmed that the
Indian Commerce Clause constituted of a “greater transfer of
power” from the states to the United States than the Interstate
Commerce Clause. 111 Despite these findings, the Court determined
that the IGRA’s requirement that states are subject to suit for failure
to negotiate in good faith unconstitutional because it violated state
sovereign immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. 112
The Court also rejected the Ex Parte Young exception for
prospective injunctive relief against state officials to “end a
continuing violation of federal law.” 113 The Court believed that
because Congress, in § 2710(d)(7), provided tribes the remedy of a
declaratory judgment that demands compact negotiations under §
2710(d)(3) to conclude within sixty days, the Seminole Tribe could
not seek injunctive relief to compel negotiations. 114 The Court
determined that alternative remedies were not needed under §
2710(d)(7), because should the state fail to comply with the
declaratory judgment, both the tribe and state would then submit
proposed compacts to a mediator as the IGRA required. 115
Although Congress attempted to fulfill its trust responsibility to
protect and enhance tribal economics by providing tribes automatic
relief should a State fail to negotiate, the Supreme Court rejected
Congress’s responsible appropriation of a duty on a state to
negotiate in good faith. Yet, Seminole’s holding left tribes in a
precarious position because they could no longer challenge states
that demanded a share of gaming revenue during compacting. Tribes
are now dependent on the Secretary to issue regulations should the
state refuse to negotiate. This new dependency exists since the
110

Id. at 57.
Id. at 62. The Court made this distinction since States do enjoy authority over
interstate commerce through the dormant Commerce Clause but can only
exercise authority over Indian Commerce through express delegations by
Congress. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192
(1989) (distinguishing between the Indian Commerce Clause and Interstate
Commerce Clause); Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New
Mexico, 458 U.S. 832, 845–46 (1982) (rejecting existence of dormant Indian
Commerce Clause).
112
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. at 76.
113
Id. at 73–74 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
114
Id. at 74–76.
115
Id.
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IGRA provides tribes no other remedy when a state refuses to
negotiate in good faith and agency action has proven inadequate. 116
IV. THE ABSENCE OF TRIBAL ECONOMICS IN REVENUE SHARING
AGREEMENTS
Class III gaming is an offshoot of the United States policy of
self-determination that aims to provide tribes the means to “direct[]
their own development.” 117 Tribes remain subjected to Congress’s
power “[t]o regulate commerce . . . with the Indian tribes.” 118 There
is no question the IGRA limits tribes’ ability to achieve selfdetermination because many states use the compact requirement to
“extort Indian tribes” for gaming net revenue. 119 This hurdle rejects
the foundation of the kinship relationship between states and tribes
as permanent neighbors since it disincentivizes tribes to act with
generosity by assisting the states with gaming revenue. Congress has
essentially forced tribes to become subservient and dependent on the
state for the ability to operate Class III gaming for economic
development because of the compacting requirement. 120 This causes
tension between the tribes and states because neither is looking out
for the other’s best interest; rather, they seek only to profit of one
another.
The Seminole decision effectively ended the IGRA’s
enforcement of good faith negotiations to ensure tribes received
adequate consideration in compacts. 121 States are no longer required
to enter into compact negotiations and many demand that tribes
agree to revenue sharing as a prerequisite for negotiations. This
practice does not provide tribes adequate consideration within a
tribal economy because good faith is absent, it avoids generosity in
favor of greed, infringes on the tribes’ sovereign right to determine
116

See United States v. Spokane Tribe of Indians, 139 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir.
1998).
117
COHEN, supra note 88, at § 21.01; see also Letter from President Richard M.
Nixon to the United States Congress (July 8, 1970), in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES INDIAN POLICY, 256–58 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed. 2000).
118
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
119
Fletcher, supra note 11, at 58.
120
Eric Lent, Are States Beating the House?: The Validity of Tribal-State
Revenue Sharing Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 91 GEO. L.J. 451,
469–470 (2003).
121
See supra Part III.
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surplus revenue, and violates the foundations of the kinship
relationship between tribes and the United States as brothers.
Due to the United States’ failure to require states to act in good
faith, tribes are unable to steward and protect the monetary resources
Class III gaming provides. Revenue sharing spurns tribal
sovereignty because tribes bargain with states as unequal
sovereigns, though both enjoy concurrent regulatory jurisdiction.
The tribes’ bargaining power is limited to its projected economic
contributions that states crave, which makes tribes slightly more
powerful than a mere beggar at negotiations.
The Fifth Circuit in Texas v. United States illustrated that tribes
lack bargaining power. 122 This came from a rejection of the
Secretary’s promulgation of 25 C.F.R. Part 291 in response to
Seminole. 123 The rules contain provisions that apply when the state
and tribe cannot agree on a compact, and the state asserts state
sovereign immunity in actions brought under § 2710(d)(7)(B).124
The Fifth Circuit determined that the rules were “not a reasonable
interpretation of [the] IGRA” because they violated the Johnson Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1166, and “may authorize Class III gaming without a
compact.” 125 Tribes have no recourse but to accept substantial
exclusivity if a state demands revenue sharing especially when a
state considers it a gift rather than a detriment. 126
This article will now discuss the evolution of revenue sharing
agreements and substantial exclusivity by categorically expanding
122

See text accompanying infra note 125.
25 C.F.R. § 291.1 (1999) (stating that regulations under this part are invoked
when a state and tribe cannot agree to a compact or if a state invokes sovereign
immunity in suit brought under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)).
124
25 C.F.R. §§ 291.1, 291.8 (1999).
125
Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 509 (5th Cir. 2007). The Johnson Act
makes it illegal to use or possess any gaming device within Indian Country. In
addition, the Texas Court inferred that because the Department of Interior can
allow a tribe to pursue Class III gaming without a compact, it is a de facto
breach of deferred congressional power to allow a tribe to pursue gaming
without the state’s consent. See 24 U.S.C. § 1175(a) (2012). Similarly, 18
U.S.C. § 1166 (2012) delegates to the states both regulatory and criminal
authority over gambling in “Indian Country” except for gaming permitted under
the IGRA. “Indian Country” is defined as tribal reservation land under the
jurisdiction of the United States, any “dependent Indian community” within the
United States, and Indian allotments and titles that have not been extinguished
by Congress. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012).
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Tiger Stadium Fan Club, Inc. v. Governor, 553 N.W.2d 7, 12 (Mich. Ct. App.
1996).
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on how the agreements violate tribal economics. This will show how
accepted practices underlying revenue sharing for substantial
exclusivity agreements do not provide tribes adequate consideration.
The United States District Court of Alaska’s metaphor that “tribal
sovereignty is but a stick in front of a tank” continues to apply.127
The difference here is that the definition of “Indian Country” is not
the stick, as thought of by the United States District Court of
Alaska. 128 Rather, the tribe’s ability to properly negotiate with states
is the stick because the United States, as the tank, does not require
states to negotiate in good faith. The lack of good faith exists
because substantial exclusivity is not adequate consideration within
a tribal economy. Because of this, the United States continues to fail
to act as a proper brother to the tribes by controlling its children, the
states.
A. Meaningful Concessions
The “IGRA [attempts to be] an example of ‘cooperative
federalism’ in that it seeks to balance the competing sovereign
interests of the federal government, state governments, and Indian
tribes, by giving each a role in the regulatory scheme.” 129 Tribal
economics is rejected though because compacts deny tribes the
ability to incorporate kinship relations into dealings and forces them
to submit to American capitalism. 130 Each compact represents a
breach of trust as each secretarial approval is an implicit application
of an assimilation policy that rejects good faith and generous
exchanges for the betterment of all persons. A meaningful
concession in tribal economics is a detriment that is made for the
betterment of everyone. Substantial exclusivity is devoid of that
feature.

127

Native Vill. of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. State of Alaska, 687 F. Supp. 1380,
1392 (D. Alaska 1988) rev’d, 918 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1990) opinion withdrawn
and superseded on denial of reh’g, 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991) aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991).
128
Id.
129
Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of Pauma & Yuima Reservation v.
California, 813 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2015).
130
See FREDERICK E. HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE
THE INDIANS, 1880-1920 13–15 (Bison Books ed. 2001).
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The state’s refusal to consider everyone possibly affected by a
compact is demonstrated in the aftermath of the Mashantucket
Pequot’s 1990 successful challenge to Connecticut’s refusal to
negotiate. 131 The compact the two parties agreed to contains the first
revenue sharing provision. The Tribe provided the State with
specified percentages of net revenue from particular pari-mutuel
games. 132 The parties later expanded the revenue sharing agreement
to provide that the Tribe would provide the larger of “$100 million
or twenty-five percent” of net revenue derived from slot
machines. 133 In return, the State provided the Tribe with the
exclusive right to install and operate slot machines. 134 In 1994,
exclusivity ended when the State compacted with the Mohegan
Tribe, also in Connecticut, for the use of slot machines. 135
Through the original substantial exclusivity term’s breach, it is
evident that adequate consideration cannot be found in any such
agreement. As other tribes pursue gaming for economic
development, good faith is unascertainable because subsequent
compacts can inherently breach substantial exclusivity agreements.
This puts all kinship relations between a state and relevant tribes at
risk as they are not considered at the time of compacting. 136
Despite the inherent conflict with tribal economics, the
Secretary has taken the position that substantial exclusivity
agreements are compatible with the jurisprudential standard of good
faith. 137 After Seminole, the Secretary defined the standard for good
131

Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024 (2d. Cir. 1990).
Tribal-State Compact, Mashantucket Pequot Tribe-Conn., § 8(b) (1991).
(Compact published for notice and comment Apr. 17, 1991; compact approved
and published May 31, 1991, 56 Fed. Reg. 24996). Although the Compact
contained a provision that stated that nothing in the compact would be construed
to be an extension of Connecticut taxes, the compact required the Mashantucket
Pequot to “takeout” a percentage of winning pari-mutual tickets as influenced by
Connecticut law. Id. §§ 17(f), 8(b). (The Secretary responded to this expansion,
and others, of Connecticut tax law by not modifying such provisions as they
were a result of the compact bargain).
133
Joseph M. Kelly, Indian Gaming Law, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 501, 511 (1995).
134
Id.
135
Tribal-State Compact, Mohegan Tribe-Conn., § 3(a)(i), (1994), (compact
approved and published 59 Fed. Reg. 65130).
136
See infra Part V.C.3. California has begun compacting with area tribes to not
pursue Class III gaming for economic development while requiring nearby Class
III tribes to agree in their compacts that they will provide the nongaming tribe
with a percentage of revenue.
137
See supra note 10.
132

190

American Indian Law Journal

[Vol. 5:1

faith as whether the state “offered meaningful concessions in return
for its demands.” 138 The Secretary maintains that substantial
exclusivity is one of few meaningful concessions a state can provide
a tribe in return for revenue sharing. 139 The Secretary defines
substantial exclusivity as “prohibiting non-Indian gaming from
competing with Indian gaming or by agreeing to relinquish
payments if non-Indian gaming is permitted by the state in the
future.” 140 The Secretary maintains that a meaningful concession
abides by the statutory demand that the State cannot compact to
“impose any tax, fee, charge or other assessment on an Indian
tribe.” 141
Courts reviewing whether the Secretary appropriately found that
the state provided a meaningful concession look to the totality of the
circumstances as to whether the state’s concessions counterbalance
the revenue sharing fee. 142 Analysis is through “[g]eneral principles
of federal contract law” rather than the lens of the trust

138

Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. California, 331 F.3d 1094, 1111 (9th
Cir. 2003) [hereinafter In re Indian Gaming Cases]. This definition of good faith
enables the court to retain pre-Seminole constructions of 25 U.S.C. §
2710(d)(1)(B). For example, the In re Indian Gaming Cases Court construed the
statute to mean that “a state need only allow Indian tribes to operate games that
others can operate, but need not give tribes what others cannot have.” Id. at 1099
(quoting Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250,
1258 (9th Cir. 1994)). Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit appears to be the only
circuit to earnestly distinguish meaningful concessions from taxes. See
Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 784 F.3d 1076, 1079-80 (7th Cir. 2015) cert.
denied, 136 S.Ct. 231 (2015); Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Gerlach, 155 F.
Supp 3d 972, 992 (D.S.D. 2015); Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921,
932 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that the Ninth Circuit is the only to address the
validity of the agreements). Although not in line with revenue sharing, the
Eighth Circuit recently indicated that challenges to the validity of revenue
sharing agreements would depend on whether the tribe is the “primary
beneficiary” of the compact. City of Duluth v. Fond du Lac Band of Lake
Superior Chippewa, 785 F.3d 1207, 1211 (8th Cir. 2015). Such speculation is
warranted because the Court quoted both statutory language and legislative
history stating that Congress’s goal is to promote tribal economic development
and prevent tribes from being wholly dependent on the federal government for
funding.
139
Babbitt, supra note 13.
140
Id.
141
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(4); see also In re Indian Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d at
1112.
142
In re Indian Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d at 1112.
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relationship. 143 Because § 2710(d)(4) does not categorically prohibit
fee demands, if the court determines that the parties agreed to the
fee in good faith, the court interprets the fee as not a tax.” 144 Courts
that analyze whether a revenue sharing provision is a fee or a tax:
(I) may take into account the public interest, public
safety, criminality, financial integrity, and adverse
economic impacts on existing gaming activities, and
(II) shall consider any demand by the State for direct
taxation of the Indian tribe or of any Indian lands as
evidence that the State has not negotiated in good
faith. 145
Through this analysis, the court and the Secretary often determine
that revenue sharing is not a tax because tribes make the sovereign
business decision to enter into the compact. 146 This forces tribes to
reject generosity because rather than assist the state after providing
for the tribe, they are forced to provide for the state before tribal
members. Tribes have no incentive to further assist the state.147
Courts refuse to integrate tribal economics into the analysis because
cooperative federalism seeks to “incorporat[e] or integrat[e] Indian
tribes as sovereign political entities within ‘Our Federalism.’” 148
Because tribal economics contrasts sharply with American
capitalism, 149 substantial exclusivity does not promote the building
143

Cachil Dehe Band of Wintum Indians v. California, 618 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th
Cir. 2010); see Gover & Gede, supra note 10, at 214 (stating that the IGRA has
forced tribes to become players in state law and policy).
144
In re Indian Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d at 1112.
145
Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of the Rincon Reservation v.
Schwarzenegger, 602 F.3d 1019, 1027 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 25 U.S.C. §
2710(d)(7)(B)(iii)).
146
Lent, supra note 120, at 469–470 (2003).
147
But see id. at 470 (stating that tribes use substantial exclusivity not to achieve
an asset but to pay for the right to pursue gaming).
148
Skibine, Indian Gaming and Cooperative Federalism, supra note 18, at 287.
149
See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE INDIANS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: FROM THE
REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO THE PRESENT 34 (first paperback ed. 1988); Manley
A. Begay, Jr. et al., Development, Governance, Culture: What are They and
What Do They Have to Do with Rebuilding Native Nations?, in REBUILDING
NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 34, 34–41
(Miriam Jorgensen ed., 2007) (discussing the conditions tribes face when
pursuing economic development); EagleWoman, Tribal Nation Economics,
supra note 14, at 396–98 (discussing United States trade restraints on tribes and
tribal responses).

192

American Indian Law Journal

[Vol. 5:1

and maintenance of the kinship relationship between tribes and
states. The relationships are rejected because the state determines
the percentage of net revenue it receives and defines the exclusivity
territory which often is not economically advantageous for the
tribe. 150 This demonstrates the lack of good faith, generosity, and
fundamental differences between capitalism and tribal economics
and why a traditional contract law analysis is insufficient. There
simply is no consideration provided by the state to accord with tribal
economics.
B. Creating Dependence on a State is Not a Meaningful
Concession
Although Congress has not demonstrated a clear intent to
abrogate tribal inherent sovereignty, 151 substantial exclusivity
provisions have changed the sovereignty hierarchy. Every approved
compact further erodes tribal sovereignty because states impose
requirements in addition to revenue sharing. States can require
regulatory authority over the gaming enterprise and reimbursement
for costs the state incurs in regulation or enforcement. 152 States have
also required tribes to provide “payments in lieu of taxes” to account
in advance for localized services including emergency services and
policing. 153 This forces tribes to make the decision of whether the
potential economic benefits of Class III gaming are for the best
150

See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 66–68 (discussing the rise of off-reservation
gaming).
151
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2039 (2014).
152
See generally Tribal-State Compact, Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe-Mass.,
(2013) (compact approved and published 79 Fed. Reg. 6213); Tribal-State
Compact, Seneca Nation of Indians-N.Y. (2002) (compact approved and
published 67 Fed. Reg. 72968); Tribal-State Compact, Coeur d’Alene TribeIdaho (1992) (compact approved and published 58 Fed. Reg. 8478); Tribal-State
Compact, Mashantucket Pequot Tribe-Conn. (1991) (compact published for
notice and comment Apr. 17, 1991; compact approved and published 56 Fed.
Reg. 24996); Tribal-State Compact, Omaha Tribe of Neb.-Neb. (1990) (compact
approved and published 57 Fed. Reg. 7290).
153
See Kevin K. Washburn, Indian Gaming: A Primer on the Development of
Indian Gaming, The NIGC and Several Important Unresolved Issues, A.B.A.
Center for Continuing Legal Education National Institute, Criminal Justice
Section, Gaming Enforcement, Feb. 7-8 2002. Payments in lieu of taxes are not
considered taxes because to be considered a tax against a tribe, a tax must be
levied with “the power of sale and forfeiture” should the tribe fail to pay. See In
re Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737, 760 (1866).
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interest for the tribe because it has to relinquish control of its internal
governance to pursue this form of economic development.
This is not how Justice Marshall in Cherokee Nation envisioned
the trust relationship between the United States and tribes. The
United States is the “great father” charged with protecting tribal
inherent sovereignty since tribes “appeal to [the United States] for
relief,” not the individual states. 154 Seminole has forced tribes to
depend on the states to compact in good faith in order to engage in
Class III gaming since the IGRA’s enforcement mechanism has
been deemed unconstitutional. 155 This changes the sovereignty
hierarchy from one where tribes enjoy greater sovereignty than
states by being a domestic dependent nation whose pupilage is to the
United States, 156 to one where tribes are dependent on the individual
state. The IGRA, and subsequent interpretations, have effectively
delegated the tribe’s dependence on the United States to the
individual states, similar to Public Law 280’s delegation of
jurisdiction.
There is no question that Congress intended to provide tribes
with the superior bargaining position in compact negotiations
through the IGRA’s good faith requirement. 157 Although revenue
sharing existed before the Seminole decision, tribes did not enter
into the agreements out of requirement, but out of generosity. Now
states often use revenue sharing as a prerequisite for substantive
compact negotiations. 158 This power play within each revenue
sharing agreement causes tribes to discard a portion of their inherent
sovereign authority in dictating how they choose to use gaming to
achieve self-determination through economic development.159
154

Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1, 2 (1831).
See supra section III; see also PRUCHA, supra note 149, at 28–54.
156
See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 2.
157
See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(3)(A), (d)(7)(A)(i), (d)(7)(B)(ii)–(iii) (2012).
158
Fletcher, supra note 11, at 58–60.
159
For example, the Pueblo of Pojoaque is currently enmeshed in a legal battle
with the State of New Mexico in the Tenth Circuit because the State refuses to
renegotiate the compact unless the Tribe agrees to increase the revenue sharing
agreement from eight percent to ten percent. Pueblo of Pojoaque v. New Mexico
(10th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-2187); Anne Minard, Pojoaque Tribe Says New Mexico
is Bullying Them Into Higher Revenue Sharing Rate, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY
MEDIA NETWORK (July 15, 2015),
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2015/07/15/pojoaque-tribe-saysnew-mexico-bullying-them-higher-revenue-sharing-rate-161072.
155

194

American Indian Law Journal

[Vol. 5:1

States have created a new form of tribal dependency – one based on
greed. This is contrary to the dependency, as the federal government
views it, because state-caused dependency does not protect and
assist tribal economic development as the “great father.” 160 There is
no question that Congress’s inability to restore the balance of power
between tribes and states after Seminole represents a failure to act as
the guardian for all tribes, as established by Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 161 despite appeasing the states after Cabazon by enacting
the IGRA.
What can be negotiated for at the bargaining table is not the only
limitation on a tribe’s ability to pursue Class III gaming. The state’s
constitution can also serve as an effective limitation as to what
games the tribe can use for economic development. 162 Indeed as
stated by the Tenth Circuit, “[s]tate law must determine whether a
state has validly bound itself to a compact.” 163 Such a declaration is
significant because the IGRA defines card games as Class II if they
“are not explicitly prohibited by the laws of the State and are played
at any location in the State.” 164 Because the state can refuse to
compact if its constitution or laws prohibit specific games, tribes are
dependent on the state to either amend its law or allow the tribe to
engage in games that conflict with state law. 165
With many states outlawing or significantly limiting
gambling, 166 States remain in a powerful position to demand
160

See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 2.
Id.
162
See generally Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 794 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2015).
163
Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546, 1557 (10th Cir. 1997).
164
25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A)(ii)(II) (2012).
165
See infra Part IV.C.; Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 794 F.3d at 1043–44; See
generally In re Indian Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d 1094. In Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene
Tribe, the issue surrounded whether Texas Hold’em was to be construed as a
Class II or Class III game. By citing IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 20, the Court
determined that it was not because “[g]ambling is contrary to public policy and
is strictly prohibited” and exceptions for the lottery, pari-mutuel betting, bingo,
and raffle charity games may not “employ any form of casino gambling
including, but not limited to . . . poker.” 794 F.3d at 1043. Also of significance
is that the Court refused to apply the Indian Canons of Construction to benefit
the Coeur d’Alene Tribe since IDAHO CODE § 18-3801 provided a “statutory
exemption for bona fide contests of skill, speed, strength or endurance” because
such a reading would make the statute in conflict with the Idaho Constitution.
Id. at 1043.
166
See generally IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 20; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9; UTAH
CONST. art. VI, § 27; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, ch. 38, § 941–961 (West 2015).
161
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revenue sharing agreements with tribes. 167 Capitalization of this
superior bargaining position does not equate to adequate
consideration in a tribal economy because negotiations are not in
good faith. Nor are they entered into out of a generous desire to help
their tribal neighbors. Rather, compacts are the culmination of state
greed and exploitation. This contravenes any foundation of kinship
relationship between the state and the tribe because the compacting
process is based on hostility and individualism and not building a
cohesive community. States deny tribes the ability to steward its
economic resources gained through Class III gaming because the
State takes its percentage of net revenue before the tribe can account
for tribal needs. The state denies the best interest of the tribe in
negotiations and tribes try their damnedest to prevent the state from
exploiting its weakened bargaining position. There simply is a
failure to consider the best interest of both the tribe and state by both
parties in an attempt to achieve a mutually beneficial arrangement.
The hostility involved in compact negotiations makes tribes
disinclined to act generously by sharing surplus monies with the
state because of the disregard for the kinship-based economy. 168
C. Judicial Refusal to Accommodate and Amend Bad Faith
Compacts
Quite recently, the Ninth Circuit determined in Pauma Band of
Luiseno Mission Indians of Pauma & Yuima Reservation v.
California that a tribe cannot retrospectively challenge a revenue
sharing agreement or any other fee arrangement in a compact

167

See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (2012). Class III gaming is lawful if the tribe
is “located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person,
organization, or entity.” Id.
168
This is not always true though. In Dalton v. Pataki, the New York Court of
Appeals held that the IGRA preempted the State’s constitutional ban on
commercial gambling and allowed the governor to enter compact negotiations
because the state allowed regulated gambling. 855 N.E.2d 1180, 1189 (2005).
Furthermore, North Carolina has rejected the argument that 25 U.S.C. §
2710(d)(1)(B)’s mandate requires the state to permit the same gaming
opportunities for its citizens that is compacted for with the tribe. McCracken &
Amick, Inc. v. Perdue, 687 S.E.2d 690, 696 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009). See also CAL.
CONST. art. IV, § 19.
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“actually reached” between the state and tribe. 169 The only remedy
available to a tribe for a bad faith compact approved by the Secretary
is rescission of the compact. 170 Through the Pauma Band’s
experience, it is evident that tribes do not receive adequate
consideration. Good faith transactions within a kinship network
require accommodation and a willingness to build off of and repair
mistakes, not an arbitrary end to the agreement. 171 Where compacts
are devoid of these traditional facets of kinship, consideration in a
tribal economic framework is absent.
In 2000, the Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians and over
sixty other tribes in California signed nearly identical compacts due
to fears that the Department of Justice would punish California
tribes without compacts. 172 Tribal fear was also due in part to the
California Supreme Court’s holding that Proposition 5, a ballot
approved statute that allowed compacts and Indian gaming, was
unconstitutional because it violated Article IV, Section 19(e) of the
California Constitution since it allowed casinos. 173 California voters
responded on March 7, 2000, by ratifying Proposition 1A, a
constitutional amendment that exempted tribes from Section 19 and
provided a “constitutionally protected monopoly [for tribes] on most
types of Class III games.” 174
Because of the quagmire, the Pauma Band in April 2000 signed
a compact negotiated in September 1999 because the compacts
provided tribes licenses for specific games (such as slot machines)
based on a mathematical formula. 175 The Pauma court
169

Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of Pauma & Yuima Reservation v.
California, 813 F.3d 1155, 1173 (9th Cir. 2015).
170
See id. at 1173.
171
See generally RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES,
AND REPUBLICS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION, 1615-1815 IX–X (22nd printing,
2009).
172
Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians, 813 F.3d at 1161; In re Indian
Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d at 1103.
173
Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians, 813 F.3d at 1160-61; Hotel
Employees & Rest. Employees Int’l Union v. Davis, 981 P.2d 990, 1005 (Cal.
Sup. Ct. 1999).
174
Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians v. California, 813 F.3d at 1161; In
re Indian Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d at 1103.
175
Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians v. California, 813 F.3d, at 1161; for
more information about the mathematics underlying licensing pool agreements,
see Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of Colusa Indian Cmty v. California,
618 F.3d 1066, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 2010).

2016]

Money is for Nothing

197

acknowledged that “[d]ue to the limited time the tribes had to
negotiate with [California], the parties agreed to the 1999 Compact
without ever discussing their radically different interpretations of
how many licenses the statewide license pool formula actually
produced.” 176 In December 2003 California declared the license
pool exhausted and the Pauma received only 200 of 750 requested
slot machine licenses in the following draw. 177 The Pauma
successfully renegotiated the compact with California in 2004 for
unlimited licenses. 178 The Pauma and five other tribes amended their
compacts with California to provide for an additional 22,500 slot
machine licenses to be distributed outside the license limits
contained in the 1999 Compacts. 179 California only provided the
Pauma with about 1,050 licenses each year, despite neighboring
tribes each having a minimum of 2000 slot machine licenses and
raised the annual fee from $315,000 to $7.75 million per year. 180
In 2010, the Ninth Circuit held that the Cachil Dehe Band of
Wintun Indians were correct that California erred in the calculation
of the amount of licenses available in December 2003. 181 Shortly
after, the Pauma filed a complaint that attacked the formation of the
2004 Amendment under various theories, including mistake and
misrepresentation. 182 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit determined that a
misrepresentation of fact occurred because an additional 8,050
licenses existed the license pool in December 2003. 183
The Pauma also argued that California negotiated in bad faith in
all dealings during the prior fifteen years and requested the court to
compel re-negotiation of the Amendment. 184 The Court
acknowledged that if California had properly represented the
number of licenses available, the 2004 amendment “never would
have been negotiated in the first place” but declined to compel
California to re-enter negotiations since the 2004 Amendment was
176

Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians v. California, 813 F.3d, at 1161.
Id.
178
Id.
179
Cachil Dehe Band, 618 F.3d at 1072.
180
Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians v. California, 813 F.3d, at 1162.
181
Cachil Dehe Band, 618 F.3d at 1084–85.
182
Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians v. California, 813 F.3d 1155 at
1162.
183
Id. at 1166.
184
Id. at 1171.
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judicially rescinded. 185 The Court also interpreted the IGRA to find
that it forbids compelling a state to re-negotiate when bad faith
negotiations occur because the IGRA’s remedies “simply do not
apply when the state and the tribe have actually reached a
Compact.” 186
For tribes, this secondary holding is catastrophic because a good
faith assessment in a compact will only be determined as to primary
negotiations where a state refuses to sign, not the subsequent
negotiations or the actual terms of the compact. In other words, once
the Secretary approves the compact, the compact is considered to
have been negotiated in good faith. If bad faith is found after the
state has signed, the court will only rescind the compact.
The Pauma holding enshrines the idea that compacts do not
require good faith dealing because while mistakes will always be
made, rescission as the sole remedy removes the United States’
burden of compelling the states to fix mistakes and deal in good
faith. 187 This pushes tribes further from engaging in generous acts
such as gifting surplus revenue to the state. Tribal ability to provide
for its members also suffers because a state can manipulate the tribe
to enter into a fraudulent compact and only fear that the compact
will be judicially rescinded. The state does not have to worry about
punishment from the United States; it only gambles on the tribe’s
prospective economic contribution through revenue sharing. This is
not how a proper kinship network in a tribal economy operates.
V. THE DUBIOUSNESS OF SUBSTANTIAL EXCLUSIVITY
There is no question that “[a] compact is a contract[, that]
represents a bargained-for exchange between its signatories.” 188 The
IGRA’s compact process enables states to encumber tribal land
subject to the Secretary and National Indian Gaming Commission’s
(NIGC) approval because the compact requirement restricts tribal

185

Id. at 1173.
Id.
187
See generally RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES,
AND REPUBLICS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION, 1615-1815 IX–X (22nd printing,
2009).
188
Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 20 (2001).
186
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use of its land. 189 Both agencies are required by 25 U.S.C. § 81 to
prevent the exchange of “dubious services . . . in exchange for
enormous fees.” 190
The Secretary is required to approve any “agreement or contract
with an Indian tribe that encumbers Indian lands for a period of 7 or
more years.” 191 Only if the Secretary determines that the agreement
does not fall within the statute’s scope does it not apply. 192 Absent
a specific statute, this standard applies to any service transaction
involving Indian land that could lessen the land’s value. 193 When a
state “permits” a tribe to engage in Class III gaming, 194 a service is
involved because the state is not required to enter into compact
negotiations and consents to the tribe’s engagement in Class III
gaming to prevent the land from further depreciation in value. 195
Generally, substantial exclusivity arrangements are approved
due to § 2710 (C)(vii)’s grant for negotiations to include anything
“directly related to the operation of gaming activities” including
“negative externalities.” 196 Regardless of how the parties address
the issues, 197 the IGRA’s failure to address the limitations of the

189

25 U.S.C. §§ 81(b), (f)(2). Subsection (f)(2) states that “Nothing in this
section shall be construed to . . . amend or repeal the authority of the National
Indian Gaming Commission under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.”
Furthermore, 25 U.S.C. § 2711 expressly states for management contracts under
the IGRA “[t]he authority of the Secretary under section 81 of this title, relating
to management contracts regulated pursuant to this chapter, is hereby transferred
to the [National Indian Gaming] Commission.
190
Penobscot Indian Nation v. Key Bank of Maine, 112 F.3d 538, 548 (1st Cir.
1997).
191
25 U.S.C. § 81(b) (2012).
192
Id. § 81(c).
193
Penobscot Indian Nation, 112 F.3d at 550–51 (1st Cir. 1997); Wisconsin
Winnebago Bus. Comm. v. Koberstein, 762 F.2d 613, 619 (7th Cir. 1985);
Encumbrance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also A.K.
Management Co. v. San Manuel Band of Mission Indians, 789 F.2d 785, 786
(9th Cir.1986). The critical word in § 81 is “services” because sales of goods are
not included under the statue. U.S. ex rel. Steele v. Turn Key Gaming, Inc., 260
F.3d 971, 975 (8th Cir. 2001).
194
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B).
195
Id. at (d)(3)(B); supra Part III.; Permit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).
196
Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of Rincon Reservation v.
Schwarzenegger, 602 F.3d 1019, 1033 (9th Cir. 2010 (citing In re Indian
Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d 1094, 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2003)).
197
See id.
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provision should place it within the protections of § 81.198
Furthermore,
Congress intended that there would be both federal
and state review of gaming contracts; however, the
two serve entirely separate functions. Federal
approval is designed to ensure that the contracts
tribes enter into are fair and reasonable. State
compacts, however, are designed to protect the
state’s taxing authority and police powers over
gaming and are not designed to protect tribal
interests. 199
Because of this, § 81 requires both the Secretary and the NIGC
to protect tribes from “improvident[,] unconscionable” and illusory
compact provisions. 200 This duty includes protection from
substantial exclusivity arrangements because they often are an
illusory service used as consideration for enormous fees under the
guise of revenue sharing agreements. 201
This section will first discuss the economic benefits states often
receive in addition to revenue sharing. Second, this section will
analyze the illusory nature of substantial exclusivity and how it
contrasts with tribal economics. Finally, this section explores how
revenue sharing arrangements in New York, Oklahoma, California,
and California both conform and contrast to tribal economics. This
analysis shows that the state is the primary beneficiary under
substantial exclusivity provisions and their inherent bad faith nature
makes them inadequate for consideration in tribal economics.

198

See Guidiville Band of Pomo Indians v. NGV Gaming, Ltd., 531 F.3d 767,
786 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the plain language of § 2710(b)(2)(A) does not
establish a § 81 duty within a contract between a tribe and a third party).
199
Catskill Dev., L.L.C. v. Park Place Entm’t Corp., 547 F.3d 115, 126 (2d Cir.
2008) (emphasis added).
200
In re Sanborn, 148 U.S. 222, 227 (1893); United States v. Colville, No.
2:97CV330-C, 1998 WL 1818928, 6 (W.D.N.C. June 23, 1998).
201
Also of note is that 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(3)(B)’s requirement of Secretary
approval regardless of the length of the compact supersedes 25 U.S.C. § 81(b)’s
requirement that approval is necessary only for contracts entered into for over
seven years.
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A. Gaming Provides the State with Inherent Economic Benefits
After Seminole, states began to demand concessions including
profits, treaty rights, endowments, and flat fee payments. 202 In 2012,
revenue sharing provided the states an estimated $1.5 billion influx
of capital. 203 This staggering number is caused in part due to many
tribes not having alternative resources to appease state greed. 204
Indeed, states that insist on revenue sharing reject the inherent
generosity tribes provide through economic stimulation for rural and
some urban markets. This hinders a practicable kinship network
within a cooperative federalism framework because revenue sharing
preempts any chance of equivocal exchange between the two
sovereigns.
At least three reasons demonstrate the positive impacts gaming
has on neighboring off-reservation communities, especially in rural
areas. First, people who travel to the facility from outside the
immediate region to engage with the gaming facility makes it a
regional economic asset because of the inevitable tax revenue the
state gains from purchases of goods and services by the visitors.205
Second, gaming provides employment opportunities for the local,
regional, and reservation locales which provides an economic
stimulus in generally impoverished regions. 206 Third, gaming
revenue is not subject to the global economy because it stays within
the tribe’s governing jurisdiction allowing the tribe to reinvest
revenue for tribal and regional development adding further benefit
to the state. 207
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Fletcher, supra note 11, at 59.
Randall K. Q. Akee, et al., The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and Its Effects
on American Indian Economic Development, 29 THE J. OF ECON. PERSP. 185,
201 (2015).
204
See generally California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202
at 218–221 (stating that the tribe did not have natural resources and was
dependent on bingo enterprise).
205
Akee, et al., supra note 203, at 201.
206
Id. at 202. One sixteen-year study that encompassed over 100 communities
found that communities near an Indian gaming facility experienced a reduction
in employment in part due to the increased employment opportunities. Id. at
200.
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Class III gaming provides the state with additional benefits that
provide the state with residual economic benefits. 208 For example,
gaming tribes tend to invest in education, health services, and other
social programs to improve the standard of living on the
reservations. 209 Crime rates decrease which lessens the capital
necessary for policing the reservation. This particularly benefits
Public Law 280 states that exercise criminal jurisdiction. 210 Studies
have shown that “association with a tribe with Class III gaming
leads to higher income, fewer risky behaviors, better physical health,
and perhaps increased access to health care.” 211 Some states have
acknowledged these inherent benefits. For example, in 2015 the
Idaho Department of Labor attributed the Coeur d’Alene Resort in
Worley, Idaho as stimulating tourism and population growth that
caused an increase in construction, retail sales, health care, services,
and government jobs for Kootenai County. 212
Despite the socioeconomic benefits gaming provides, states
often require revenue sharing agreements that forego the tribe’s
ability to steward revenue and further invest for regional
development. In a kinship-based economy, tribes would be highly
compelled to assist the states in roadway development, crime
prevention, and further forms of economic development because
both parties benefit and would keep the relationship non-adversarial.
This would allow the state and tribe to focus on equivocal exchanges
based on the economic stimulation the tribe provides through its
gaming facility and the state-provided services. The relationship
would foster trust and fair dealing rather than greed, mistrust, and

208

See generally KATHRYN R.L. RAND & STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT, INDIAN
GAMING LAW AND POLICY 140–143 (2006).
209
James I. Schaap, The Growth of the Native American Gaming Industry: What
Has the Past Provided, and What Does the Future Hold?, 34 AM. IND. Q. 365,
375 (2010).
210
Id; see also RENÉE ANN CRAMER, CASH, COLOR, AND COLONIALISM: THE
POLITICS OF TRIBAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT 100 (2005).
211
Barbara Wolfe, et al., The Income and Health Effects of Tribal Casino
Gaming on American Indians, 49 DEMOGRAPHY, 499, 520 (2012).
212
Samuel Wolkenhaur, Workforce Trends, Kootenai County, IDAHO DEPT. OF
LABOR (Dec. 2015),
https://labor.idaho.gov/publications/lmi/pubs/KootenaiProfile.pdf. The author
does not intend to make these correlations absolute because many tribal casinos
have failed.
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skepticism. Yet, this does not occur as seen by substantial
exclusivity’s illusory nature.
B. The Illusory Nature of Substantial Exclusivity Terms
Only the Ninth Circuit has attempted to draw the line between
when substantial exclusivity provides a substantial economic benefit
and when it is an illusory term. 213 The court determined that the
California Constitution automatically provided tribes exclusivity
and thus could not be considered as part of negotiations. 214 In
rejecting a holistic analysis of the compact and looking at the
provision in isolation, the court determined the exclusivity
agreement illusory because California conceded nothing beyond
what the California Constitution provided. 215 The court did not
consider how California could amend its Constitution to remove
exclusivity at any time. 216 This shows that the California
Constitution promises tribes nothing because California voters at
any time can issue a constitutional amendment eradicating
exclusivity. In no way can a voidable compact term that ends
revenue sharing at the tribe’s expense be deemed a detriment
suffered by the state. 217
Voidable terms are not good faith terms within tribal economics.
First, the lack of certainty contravenes the basic notion that a
community-based relationship requires understanding that both
sovereigns will perform as the terms require. Second, tribes do not
gain any benefit other than permission to engage in Class III

213
Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of the Rincon Reservation v.
Schwarzenegger, 602 F.3d at 1037.
214
Id. at 1040.
215
Id. at 1037, 1040. After court mandated arbitration, the Secretary approved
the compact that accounted for the event of California abrogating exclusivity in
which the tribe would have the right to continue gaming under the compact and
payments owed to the State would be renegotiated, thus making the term
voidable. Tribal-State Compact, Rincon Band of Luiseno Indians-Cal., §12.4,
compact approved Feb. 8, 2013.
216
For more information regarding California’s Constitution, see supra Part
IV.C.
217
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 85 (1981) (stating that “a promise to
perform all or part of an antecedent contract of the promisor, previously
voidable by him, but not avoided prior to the making of the promise is
binding.”)
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gaming. 218 Third, the tribe’s sovereign right to determine surplus
revenue is revoked because states take their percentage of revenue
from net revenues, not surplus funds. Finally, the illusory nature of
substantial exclusivity makes such terms devoid of good faith
because the state can open non-tribal land to non-Indian competition
at any time. 219 In such circumstances the state will not suffer a true
consequence because revenue gained by state regulation would
likely off-set the loss of tribal revenue through revenue sharing and
tribes would be forced to address increased competition.
The Department of the Interior has determined that substantial
exclusivity in return for revenue sharing confers on tribes a
“substantial economic benefit.” 220 While the state must agree to an
economic disadvantage, the state retains the option of performance.
Through the terms of the compact, the state has no requirement to
maintain exclusivity since there is no duration attached to the term.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines an illusory
promise as “[w]ords of promise which by their terms make
performance entirely optional with the ‘promisor.’” 221 For an
illustration, the Restatement provides the following example:
A promises B to act as B’s agent for three years from
a future date on certain terms; B agrees that A may
so act, but reserves the power to terminate the
agreement at any time. B’s agreement is not
consideration, since it involves no promise by
him. 222
Substantial exclusivity agreements are analogous to the
Restatement’s example. First, the tribe promises the state to provide
revenue sharing for the duration of the compact for the term of
substantial exclusivity. The state agrees to this arrangement but
reserves the right to terminate exclusivity at any time and terminate
the revenue sharing agreement. Therefore, there is no consideration
218

Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of the Rincon Reservation v.
Schwarzenegger, 602 F.3d at 1040. (The “IGRA entitles tribes to negotiate for
basic Class III gaming rights without being forced to accept revenue sharing.”)
219
See 18 U.S.C. §1151 (2012).
220
See, e.g., Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Secretary – Indian
Affairs, to Honorable Russell Begaye, President, Navajo Nation (June 9, 2015).
221
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §77 (1981).
222
Id.
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because the state does not promise the tribe to ensure that exclusivity
will remain for the duration of the compact. There is nothing
resembling good faith in this arrangement; it is merely a mythic
creation that the Secretary has deemed a legitimate economic
detriment to the state. It does not promote stewardship of economic
resources or trade on mutual achievement. The state merely
promises the tribe nothing, shrouds the agreement in uncertainty,
and forces tribes to pay the state substantial amounts of revenue to
pursue gaming for economic development.
The Secretary continues to assert that substantial exclusivity
provides a “substantial economic benefit” for tribes despite their
illusory nature. 223 Therefore, the Secretary’s actions are arguably a
breach of the duty imposed by 25 U.S.C. § 81. 224 The mere
requirement that a compact defines how the term expires essentially
serves as a rubber stamp of the agreement and a breach of the
Secretary’s duty. 225 Indeed as the Michigan Court of Appeals stated
in response to a revenue sharing in exchange for exclusivity
arrangement, “[t]he state gave nothing in exchange for the
payments.” 226 Despite this understanding, the Secretary continues to
allow the practice to continue.
C. Revenue Sharing, Substantial Exclusivity, and Tribal Economics
Revenue sharing agreements provide the state a windfall of
capital that is not always used for the betterment of the reservation
and the surrounding community. For instance, in 1993, several tribes
agreed with Michigan to provide the State with “semiannual
payments of eight percent of certain gaming revenue [for] the
exclusive right to conduct specified gaming activities in the
state.” 227 The United States District Court for the Western District
of Michigan issued a consent judgment that approved the agreement
223

See Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs to
Honorable Raymond Loretto, Governor of the Pueblo of Jemez (June 9, 2015).
224
See cases cited supra note 200.
225
See Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs to
Honorable Deval Patrick, Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
(Oct. 12, 2012).
226
Tiger Stadium Fan Club, Inc. v. Governor, 553 N.W.2d 7, 12 (Mich. Ct. App.
1996).
227
Id. at 9.
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and the parties agreed to compacts that same day. 228 By 1996, the
Michigan Strategic Fund, where the payments were delivered,
accumulated $26,098,551.18 from the tribes. 229 Rather than
reinvesting that money within the reservation regions for the
betterment of the tribes and surrounding locales to stimulate
economic development, the State used the revenue to fund a grant
for the construction of Comerica Park in Detroit. 230 In hearing a case
about whether the tribal revenues were appropriations, the Michigan
Court of Appeals declared the revenue the result of “gratuitous
payments negotiated by the Governor.” 231 This highlights one of the
critical issues with revenue sharing agreements; the states are not
limited on their use of the funds. Unlike tribes who are required by
the IGRA to use net revenue in defined ways, 232 states are not
limited in their use of the funds. Actions such as Michigan’s
demonstrate a general refusal to gift the tribal community and
surrounding region with the improvements necessary for further
economic development. Substantial exclusivity does not provide the
tribe with adequate consideration because states can use the revenue
in manners that reject the building of a kinship relationship between
the state and tribe.
Not all states are the same, and some more than others compact
closer to good faith to facilitate the growth and development of a
kinship relationship with tribes. It is, therefore, appropriate to
discuss a cross-section of compact requirements from New York,
Oklahoma, California, and Idaho. Through this, discussion attempts
to illustrate how the states either attempt to embrace tribal
economics or abjectly refuse it.

228

Id.
Id.
230
Id. at 10. Comerica Park is the home of the Detroit Tigers of Major League
Baseball and replaced the iconic Tiger Stadium in 2000.
231
Id. at 13. The use of Class III gaming revenue by states is not isolated to
Michigan. In 2001, Wisconsin allocated $1.5 million for revenue sharing funds
for the construction of the Resch Center in Ashwaubenon, Wisconsin. W.S.
Miller & Chad LeBlanc, Bingo?: An Overview of the Potential Legal Issues
Arising from the Use of Indian Gaming Revenues to Fund Professional Sports
Facilities, 19 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT, 121, 130 (2009).
232
See sources cited supra note 15.
229
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1. New York
New York entered into its first tribal-state compact with the
Oneida Indian Nation in 1993. 233 The State did not require the
Oneida to provide a revenue sharing agreement and assessed the
tribe only for the “reasonable and necessary costs incurred by the
State in regulating gaming under this compact.” 234 This requirement
comported with tribal economics because not only did the compact
define what the costs could consist of; 235 it included in good faith a
provision for dispute resolution if the Tribe disagreed with the
State’s accounting. 236 New York abandoned this successful method
of dealing in 2002 and began requiring revenue sharing agreements
with tribes.
In 2002, New York compacted with the Seneca Nation and
provided the Tribe with exclusive rights in a 10,500 square mile
geographic area in Western New York. 237 In return, the Tribe was
required to provide the State with eighteen percent of the “net drop”
for the first four years, twenty-two percent for the next three years,
and then twenty-five percent for the remaining six years of the
compact. 238 This exclusivity agreement could have affected the
Tuscarora Indian Nation and the Tonawanda Band of Seneca
Indians whose reservations lie within the exclusivity range. 239 To
account for the potential infringement on the Tuscarora and
Tonawanda, the Seneca Nation and New York negotiated an
exception. 240 New York would not breach the compact should it
compact with the Tuscarora and Tonawanda for games the Seneca
Nation enjoys. 241 New York also agreed to prevent any tribe from
233
Tribal-State Compact, Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y.-N.Y., (1993) (compact
approved June 4, 1993).
234
Id. at §§ 10(b), app. D(b).
235
Id. at § app. D.
236
Id. at § app. D(f). Such procedures are fairly customary in compacts.
237
Tribal-State Compact, Seneca Nation of Indians-N.Y., § 12(a) (2002)
(compact approved Nov. 12, 2002).
238
Id. at § 12(b)(1). The compact defined net drop as “money dropped into
machines, after payout but before expense.” Id.
239
Id. at § 12(a)(2).
240
Id.
241
Id. If New York does negotiate with the other tribes, the Seneca Nation does
not have to provide the State revenue for the games the tribes compact for. Id. at
§12(a)(4).
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opening a gaming establishment within twenty-five miles of an
operating Seneca Nation casino unless that tribe had trust land
within that radius as of August 2, 2002. 242 The Seneca Nation
estimated that despite the exceptions, the compact would provide
the Tribe with a gaming enterprise worth over $5 billion and provide
the State with over $1 billion. 243
Upon review, the Secretary noted the disregard for kinship
relations by pointing to the exception and stated his concern that the
Seneca Nation’s exclusivity could limit the other tribes’ economic
opportunities. 244 Yet, the Secretary determined that the compact did
not violate the trust relationship because: 1) the Tuscarora and
Tonawanda could pursue Class III gaming on reservation land; 2)
they did not have an inherent right to pursue off-reservation gaming;
and, 3) were each traditionally opposed to gaming. 245 The Secretary
did not condone exclusivity and warned against future compacts
“pitting tribes against one another.” 246
New York also provided the Seneca Nation additional
substantial economic benefits by gifting it use of the State’s eminent
domain power, the ability to build two off-reservation casinos in the
Buffalo-Niagara Falls market, and sold the Niagara Falls
Convention Center to the Tribe for one dollar. 247 The Secretary
approved the compact because of these additional benefits. 248 While
the perks in addition to the exclusivity range can be construed as
gifts, the lack of disregard of existing kinship relations for monetary
gain is problematic.
Also problematic is that the New York Supreme Court severed
the Tribe’s eminent domain power from the compact if Buffalo
refused to allow for a casino because it violated separation of powers

242

Id. If this subsection of the compact is breached by New York, the Seneca
Nation can end all revenue sharing payments.
243
Letter from Gale A. Norton, Sec. of the Interior, to The Honorable Cyrus
Schindler, Seneca Nation President (Nov. 12, 2002).
244
Id.
245
Id.
246
Id.
247
Id.; see also Tribal-State Compact, Seneca Nation of Indians-N.Y., § 11,
(2002), (compact approved Nov. 12, 2002).
248
Letter from Gale A. Norton, Secretary of the Interior, to The Honorable
Cyrus Schindler, Seneca Nation President (Nov. 12, 2002).
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principles under the New York Constitution. 249 The State and the
Tribe did not renegotiate the compact’s substantial exclusivity
because the Tribe eventually opened casinos in both Buffalo and
Niagara Falls. 250 This example of the court modifying compact
clauses shows that substantial economic benefits are not necessarily
guaranteed and causes uncertainty for the tribe.
Despite the Seneca Nation’s economic success, the compact
shows New York’s willingness to disregard kinship relations with
non-gaming tribes in exchange for economic benefits. As Secretary
Norton indirectly expressed, the limits substantial exclusivity places
on non-gaming tribes strains intertribal kinship relations. New York
did attempt to improve kinship relations between the State and
Seneca Nation through the convention center, use of eminent
domain power, and ability to pursue off-reservation gaming. But to
be frank, these notions do not appear to be in good faith. It appears
that New York desires to capitalize from Class III gaming because
the IGRA preempts the New York Constitution’s prohibition on
commercial gambling. 251 Apparently, New York sought to exploit
the IGRA’s loophole by creating a sense of certainty that it will reap
the benefits of Class III gaming by minimizing competition, the
exclusivity range, and the two off-reservation casinos in major
markets. This shows that greed, rather than generous exchange for
the betterment of all, appears to be the primary motivation. The
notion of greed being the driving force behind substantial
exclusivity is evident because New York is paid its revenue before
the Tribe can define surplus revenue. 252 The New York model is not
249

Huron Grp., Inc. v. Pataki, 785 N.Y.S.2d 827, 854, 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004)
aff’d, 23 A.D.3d 1051 (2005).
250
Overview: Seneca Gaming Corp., THE SENECA NATION,
http://www.senecagamingcorporation.com/overview.cfm (last visited Feb. 15,
2016).
251
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9; Dalton v. Pataki, 835 N.E.2d 1180, 1189 (N.Y.
2005).
252
Tribal-State Compact, Seneca Nation of Indians-N.Y., § 12(b)(1) (2002)
(compact approved Nov. 12, 2002). It is worth noting however, that the Seneca
Nation’s parcel of land in Buffalo has been a source of contention for years
despite the Secretary deeming the land sufficient to meet the IGRA’s
requirements. See Citizens Against Casino Gambling in Erie Cty. v. Chaudhuri,
802 F.3d 267 (2d Cir. 2015) petition for cert. filed, case no. 15-780, Dec. 16,
2015. In 2010, New York attempted to enter into a very similar compact with
the Stockbridge-Munsee Community Band of Mohican Indians. In return for
twenty-five percent revenue, the tribe was to receive exclusivity rights to New
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representative of adequate consideration in a tribal economy. New
York replaces good faith, generosity, and kinship by greed driven
implications designed to maximize its own take with minimal regard
for other tribes.
2. Oklahoma
By statute, Oklahoma refuses to allow for tribal economics by
requiring tribes to accept and acknowledge to the Secretary that the
adhesion compact provides substantial exclusivity. 253 Tribes are
required to provide Oklahoma:
four percent (4%) of the first Ten Million Dollars
($10,000,000.00) of adjusted gross revenues
received by a tribe in a calendar year from the play
of electronic amusement games, electronic bonanzastyle bingo games and electronic instant bingo
games,
five percent (5%) of the next Ten Million Dollars
($10,000,000.00) of adjusted gross revenues
received by a tribe in a calendar year from the play
of electronic amusement games, electronic bonanzastyle bingo games and electronic instant bingo
games,
six percent (6%) of all subsequent adjusted gross
revenues received by a tribe in a calendar year from
the play of electronic amusement games, electronic
bonanza-style bingo games and electronic instant
bingo games, and
York City’s five boroughs, Long Island, and the Catskill Mountains in Upstate
New York. Tribal-State Compact, Stockbridge-Munsee Community Band of
Mohican Indians-N.Y., § 15, (2010), compact disapproved Feb. 18, 2011. The
Secretary denied the compact because it would limit the trust lands use solely to
gaming and did not issue an opinion about the revenue sharing agreement. Letter
from Donald Lavendure, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs,
to Honorable Kimberly M. Vele, President, Stockbridge-Munsee Community
Band of Mohican Indians (Feb. 18, 2011). It is also worth noting that this
agreement would have made New York and the Stockbridge-Munsee direct
competitors with Connecticut, the Mohegan Indian Tribe, and the Mashantucket
Pequot Tribe. See supra text accompanying note 3.
253
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3A, §§ 280, 281 (West 2015).
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ten percent (10%) of the monthly net win of the
common pool(s) or pot(s) from which prizes are paid
for nonhouse-banked card games. The tribe is
entitled to keep an amount equal to state payments
from the common pool(s) or pot(s) as part of its cost
of operating the games. 254
Oklahoma defines substantial exclusivity as the State refusing
non-Indian gaming to expand in games or locations as of 2004. 255
Tribes are required to continue revenue sharing with the State should
exclusivity be breached. 256 The entity that operates in contravention
to substantial exclusivity is punished and must provide the State “no
less than fifty percent of any increase in the entities’ adjusted gross
revenues.” 257 Tribes within forty-five miles of the entity are entitled
to “as liquidated damages . . . [a] pro rata [share] based on the
number of covered game machines operated by each Eligible Tribe
in the time period when such adjusted gross revenues were
generated.” 258
Further illustrating Oklahoma’s façade of good faith dealings
with tribes is how the State places twelve percent of gaming revenue
in the State’s General Revenue Fund and the remaining eighty-eight
percent into the Education Reform Revolving Fund. 259 Oklahoma
denies tribes any say in how the funds will be used. Although the
statute rejects tribal input to determine for itself what its surplus
funds are and then give a gift to the State, the true lack of
consideration is found in the inherent failure to deal in good faith
through the adhesion compact.
Oklahoma refuses to provide good faith negotiations because it
could subsidize non-tribal gaming expansion since the statutory
remedy for breach of exclusivity does not injure the State. This is
not proper accommodation in a tribal economy because while the
State does not suffer a consequence through the breach the tribe is
254

Id. at § 281(11)(A)(2).
Id. at § 281(11)(E).
256
Id. at § 281(11)(E).
257
Id.
258
Id.
259
Id. at § 280, 281(11)(E). The first $20,833.33 of all fees received are used
“for the treatment of compulsive gambling disorder and educational programs
related to such disorder.” Id. at § 280.
255
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still required to provide revenue sharing. Only if the State and tribe
agree to end revenue sharing if Oklahoma strikes the statutory
exclusivity of games will the Secretary approve Oklahoma
compacts. 260 Nothing addresses Oklahoma’s domination over
negotiations and refusal to accept consequences if the compact is
breached.
Oklahoma compels tribes to abandon the building of a kinship
network with the State and neighboring tribes. Any tribe that refuses
to accept the model compact’s insignificant benefits “could [be
placed] at a significant disadvantage vis-à-vis those tribes that will
be authorized to offer Class III games.” 261 This is not consideration
within a tribal economy. Negotiations are devoid of good faith,
generosity is absent, and the tribes realize revenue after the State.
Oklahoma’s greed continues to dominate as technology expands the
range tribal offerings of Class III gaming. 262
3. California
The vast majority of legal authority regarding substantial
exclusivity agreements derives from California. While this article
previously discussed the history of California’s process, 263 the
Secretary construes the exclusivity provided by the California
Constitution as a substantial economic benefit contingent on the
tribe’s primary economic market. 264 As demonstrated earlier,
260

See Letter from Michael D. Olsen, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary –
Indian Affairs, to Honorable Chad Smith, Principal Chief, Cherokee Nation
(Dec. 28, 2004).
261
See Letter from Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary – Policy and Economic
Development to Honorable LeRoy Howard, Chief, Seneca Cayuga Tribe of
Oklahoma (Jan. 6, 2006). The date stamped on the letter is probably incorrect as
to the year. It was most likely written in 2005 because the compact at issue
became active and published in the Federal Register on March 7, 2015. 70 Fed.
Reg. 11027.
262
See Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs to
Honorable Janice Prairie Chief-Boswell, Governor, Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes
(Aug. 1, 2013). In this letter, the Secretary of the Interior denied the CheyenneArapaho’s compact with Oklahoma because it would have provided Oklahoma a
twenty percent revenue share for the right to operate wireless gaming without
providing the Tribe any additional substantial economic benefit as to its
governing compact based on the Oklahoma statute.
263
See supra Part IV.C.
264
CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 19; Larry Echo Hawk, Assistant Secretary – Indian
Affairs, to Honorable Leona Williams, Chairperson, Pinoleville Pomo Nation
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substantial exclusivity is illusory despite being construed as a
voidable term. 265 California realized this before the Pauma court’s
secondary holding that courts will only rescind a compact rather
than compel negotiations. 266 For example, in California’s compact
with the Fort Independence Indian Community of Paiute Indians,
the Tribe’s only remedies should the State breach the exclusivity
requirement by amending the California Constitution are:
(1) Terminate this Compact, in which case the Tribe
will lose the right to operate Gaming Devices and
other Class III Gaming authorized by this Compact;
or
(2) Continue under this Compact. 267
The Secretary did not respond to this illusory provision.268
Needless to say, the Fort Independence Paiute has no true remedy
should California breach the exclusivity provision.
Similarly, but not nearly as drastic, the Coyote Valley Band of
Pomo Indians and California amended their compact in 2012. The
amendment provides that should exclusivity cease, the Tribe could
either terminate the compact or continue operations. If the Tribe
continues operations, it will not provide revenue contributions, it
will continue compensating the State for regulatory costs, and have
a maximum of 1,100 gaming devices. 269 It is evident that regardless
(Feb. 9, 2012). The Secretary was reluctant to approve the revenue sharing
agreement because the Tribe sits in a “highly competitive but sparsely
populated” market and competitor tribes were subject to a ten percent revenue
sharing into the Special Distribution Fund for having 751-900 gaming devices.
The Pomo are subjected to a fifteen percent revenue sharing agreement. Despite
this discrepancy, the Secretary approved the agreement because the Tribe
probably would not have that many devices and did not consider the discrepancy
in its determination.
265
See supra Part V.B.
266
See supra notes 184-186 and accompanying text.
267
Tribal-State Compact, Fort Independence Indian Community of Paiute
Indians-California, § 4.6 (2013) (compact approved and published 79 Fed. Reg.
3241).
268
79 Fed. Reg. 3241–42 (2014).
269
Amended Tribal-State Compact, Coyote Valley Band of Pomo IndiansCalifornia, § 15.4 (2012) (compact approved and published 77 Fed. Reg.
76514).
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of the purported remedies, California refuses to provide adequate
consideration within tribal economics.
First, both examples demonstrate the lack of negotiations
because both the Fort Independence Paiute and the Coyote Valley
Pomo are required to sacrifice sovereignty to pursue Class III
gaming through their highly limited forms of recourse. California’s
potential breach of exclusivity restrains tribes from expanding its
gaming enterprise for the betterment of its community. It is likely
that a tribe will continue under the compact’s restrictions to enjoy
the economic benefits of Class III gaming. Second, there is no sense
of community, particularly in the Paiute’s compact, because the
State will not hesitate to charge a tribe more than competitor tribes
for gaming devices. 270 Finally, and most significant, California
receives its share of gaming revenue before the tribe can determine
what revenue is surplus and use their revenue as a gift for either the
State or other tribes. A forced gifting is not a true gift in tribal
economics.
California’s revenue sharing agreements have long been
contentious issues in the Ninth Circuit. 271 To briefly summarize,
tribes are generally required to provide a percentage of net gaming
revenue to two State funds, the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund (RSTF)
and the Special Distribution Fund (SDF). 272
California allocates funds to all non-gaming tribes who do not
partake in gaming funds paid into the RSTF by tribes. 273 The typical
allocation for non-gaming tribes is $1.1 million per year and
California does exempt gaming tribes who have smaller gaming
enterprises. 274 Exemptions exist through a graduated contribution

270

See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
See generally Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of Rincon
Reservation v. Schwarzenegger, 602 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010); In re Indian
Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2003); Artichoke Joe’s California Grand
Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2003); Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians v. Wilson, 37 F.3d 430 (9th Cir. 1994).
272
In re Indian Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d at 1105. The SDF is also known as the
“Tribal Nation Grant Fund.”
273
Id.; Cal. Gov’t Code § 12012.75 (West).
274
In re Indian Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d at 1105; Tribal-State Compact, Fort
Independence Indian Community of Paiute Indians-California, §§ 5.1–5.2
(2013) (compact approved and published 79 Fed. Reg. 3241).
271
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dependent on how many gaming devices the tribe operates and
valuation attached on each gaming device. 275
The SDF contains a similar graduated cost contingent on the
number of gaming devices but requires a percentage of net wins
rather than a fixed number. 276 Funds paid into the SDF are mandated
by statute to follow an order or priority that removes direct tribal
input. The order is as follows:
(1) An appropriation to the Indian Gaming Revenue
Sharing Trust Fund in an aggregate amount sufficient
to make payments of any shortfalls that may occur in
the Indian Gaming Revenue Sharing Trust Fund.
(2) An appropriation to the Office of Problem and
Pathological Gambling within the State Department
of Alcohol and Drug Programs for problem gambling
prevention programs.
(3) The amount appropriated in the annual Budget
Act for allocation between the Department of Justice
and the California Gambling Control Commission
for regulatory functions that directly relates to Indian
gaming.
(4) An appropriation for the support of local
government agencies impacted by tribal gaming. 277
Both funds have been determined consistent with the IGRA
because the parties chose those methods to deal with consequences
relating to opportunity and compensation “directly related to the
operation of gaming activities.” 278 However, both funds do not
provide adequate consideration in tribal economics considering the
275

In re Indian Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d at 1105; see also Tribal-State Compact,
Pinoleville Pomo Nation-Cal., § 5.2(a)(2011) (compact approved and published
77 Fed. Reg. 5566).
276
In re Indian Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d at 1105; Amended Tribal-State
Compact, Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians-California, § 4.3.1(a)(1) (2012)
(compact approved and published 77 Fed. Reg. 76514).
277
Cal. Gov’t Code § 12012.85 (West).
278
In re Indian Gaming Cases, 331 F.3d at 1114 (quoting 25 U.S.C.
2710(3)(C)(vii) (internal quotations omitted); see also Rincon Band of Luiseno
Mission Indians of Rincon Reservation v. Schwarzenegger, 602 F.3d 1019, 1033
(9th Cir. 2010).
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duress many tribes were under when the compacts that began the
process were entered into. 279 Tribes have no say in how funds are
distributed, especially under the SDF. The RSTF denies gaming
tribes the ability to fashion kinship relations with neighboring tribes.
The State has assumed the position of a father to all tribes rather than
a partner in the community.
Recently, California has taken a domineering position that
rejects a proper kinship relationship in its compact with the North
Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians of California. 280 First, the compact
required the North Fork to provide “mitigation” to the Chukchansi
Indian Tribe by not installing a hotel until 2018 and provide
payment into the RSTF equal to the Chukchansi’s payment into the
RSTF. 281 Second, upon the initiation of actual gaming or January 1,
2016, the North Fork was required to provide a certain percentage
of net wins dependent on overall net win into the SDF and payment
to the Chukchansi would cease. 282 Finally, the North Fork was
required to pay into a trust account for the Wiyot Tribe determined
by a graduated percentage of net win. 283 The Wiyot compacted to
relinquish their right to pursue Class III gaming to ensure retrieval
of payments. 284
The Secretary did not comment on the North Fork’s compact
that contained the California Constitution’s automatic grant of
exclusivity. 285 In 2014, California voters refused to ratify the North
Fork and Wiyot’s compacts through Proposition 48. Since then the
State has refused to recognize the compact’s existence or reenter
negotiations. 286 The referendum vote has also caused the compact to
be deemed unenforceable. 287 Even though unenforceable, the
279

See supra Part IV.C.
Tribal-State Compact, North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians of Cal.-Cal.,
(2012) (compact approved and published 78 Fed. Reg. 62649).
281
Id. at §§ 4.5(a)–(b). The Chukchansi was then to be reimbursed for its
payment into the RSTF through the SDF.
282
Id. at § 4.5(c).
283
Id. at § 5.2(a).
284
Id.; Tribal-State Compact, Wiyot Tribe-Cal. (2013) (compact approved and
published 78 Fed. Reg.54908–9).
285
Tribal-State Compact, North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians of Cal.-Cal., §
4.9 (2012) (compact approved and published 78 Fed. Reg. 62649).
286
North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians of Cal. v. California, No. 1:15-cv00419-AWI-SAB, at. 5–6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2015) (order on cross-motions for
judgment on the pleadings).
287
Id. at 12.
280
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exclusivity arrangement was illusory because the State could breach
the provision and not suffer consequence. 288
It appears that California is not interested in helping make a
community where tribes are able to interact, trade, and communicate
with one another freely. The State seems fixated on dividing tribes
to maximize profit for its own gain. Even in the North Fork’s case,
absent the payments to the Wiyot, the tribe would have been
required to pay into the SDF and RSTF. 289 Even if the North Fork
are compelled to pursue gaming because of greed, the Tribe should
have the ability to steward its revenue. The Tribe should be allowed
to exercise its inherent sovereignty by declaring funds surplus and
then generously contribute to the neighboring tribes and California.
California did not compact to provide the North Fork with a gift by
compacting; it attempted to limit the Wiyot, Chukchansi, and North
Fork’s sovereignty by not allowing the Tribes to work together. This
is not representative of a community built on accommodation; this
is division and greed.
4. Idaho
Idaho appears to be using revenue sharing arrangements with
Class III gaming tribes for the development of kinship relations and
building of a good faith relationship despite substantial exclusivity
being inherent in the Idaho Constitution.290 What appears to be
typical revenue sharing agreements are actually provisions that
compel the tribe to donate five percent of all net revenue for
educational purposes. 291 Before 2002, only the Coeur d’Alene Tribe
was subject to such a provision because the Tribe itself insisted in
good faith that the provision be included. 292 The Tribe and the State
agreed that:

288

See Tribal-State Compact, North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians of Cal.Cal., § 4.9 (2012) (compact approved and published 78 Fed. Reg. 62649).
289
Id. at §§ 4.5, 5.2.
290
IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 20.
291
Tribal-State Compact, Coeur d’Alene Tribe-Idaho., § 20.2 (1992) (compact
approved and published 58 Fed. Reg. 8478).
292
Chief Allen, Opinion, Tribe’s Education Funding Above Reproach, COEUR
D’ALENE PRESS (Jan. 11, 2012, 7:00 AM),
http://www.cdapress.com/news/local_news/article_eec98240-3bb6-11e1-8d64-

218

American Indian Law Journal

[Vol. 5:1

The gaming operation shall contribute five percent
(5%) of net revenues from authorized Class III
gaming for the financial support of education. This
sum is to be divided equally between Tribal and
public education in the region on or near the
reservation. The Tribe may elect to contribute
additional sums for these or other educational
purposes. Disbursements of these funds shall be at
the sole discretion of the Tribe. 293
Idaho allows for a kinship relationship to develop between itself
and the Coeur d’Alene Tribe because it allows the Tribe to be
generous with its revenue for the benefit of both tribal members and
Idahoans. This arrangement allows the Tribe to steward its revenue
without State interference thus promoting interdependence that
benefits all involved.
Before 2002, the only other similar provision that existed in
Idaho was with the Kootenai Tribe. 294 What distinguished that
arrangement from typical revenue sharing agreements is that the
Kootenai had the option of contributing up to 2.5% of revenue “for
the financial support of local government programs, hospitals,
education or other purposes as deemed by the [Tribal] Council.”295
Idaho could not compel the Kootenai to donate any funds for any
specific purpose. This further fostered the growth of generous
exchange in a kinship-based economy.
Through the passage of Proposition 1 in 2002, Idaho codified the
Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s provision that the Tribe shall donate five
percent of net revenue for local education on and near the
reservation as a condition precedent for a compact to be amended to
include video gaming. 296 Both the Kootenai and Nez Perce Tribes,
who were not previously required to donate for educational
purposes, agreed to this condition to make video gaming an

0019bb2963f4.html. Chief Allen at the time was, and still is, the Chairman of
the Coeur d’Alene Tribe.
293
Tribal-State Compact, Coeur d’Alene Tribe-Idaho., § 20.2 (1992) (compact
approved and published 58 Fed. Reg. 8478).
294
See Tribal-State Compact, Kootenai Tribe of Idaho-Idaho., § 20 (1993)
(compact approved and published 58 Fed. Reg. 59926).
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Id. at § 20.2 (emphasis added).
296
IDAHO CODE §§ 67-429B, 67-429C.
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approved Class III game. 297 It is evident that the Coeur d’Alene’s
good faith compelled Idaho to expand the games available for Class
III gaming. Idaho allows tribes to decide if it wants to provide
benefits to their neighbors by agreeing to accommodate the
expansion of tribal economies.
Despite the Coeur d’Alene, Kootenai, and Nez Perce Tribes
working with Idaho for the benefit of all, the Shoshone-Bannock
Tribe appear to have rejected tribal economics. The ShoshoneBannock are only required to reimburse Idaho for expenses incurred
through regulation because the Tribe successfully fought against the
imposition of the donative revenue sharing requirement for video
gaming. 298 The Shoshone-Bannock’s compact contains a provision
that makes it mandatory that the Tribe can offer the same games as
other Idaho tribes. 299 Once the Kootenai and Nez Perce Tribes
amended their compacts to include video gaming, those games
automatically became approved games in the Shoshone-Bannock’s
compact. 300
The Shoshone-Bannock successfully argued before the Ninth
Circuit that the donation requirement was a tax within the meaning
of its compact. 301 It appears that the Shoshone-Bannock refuse to
act as a good neighbor to neighboring state citizens despite the State
fostering the growth of tribal economies by making video gaming a
valid Class III game. The Shoshone-Bannock’s refusal to engage
Idaho in good faith after the passage of Proposition One also
undermined kinship relations with the other Idaho tribes because it
used their detriment for its own benefit by exploiting a technicality.
In general, Idaho uniquely stands out against the norm of
revenue sharing agreements. 302 All Idaho has done is set a
297
Tribal-State Compact, Kootenai Tribe of Idaho-Idaho., § 6.8.3 (2002)
(compact approved and published 68 Fed. Reg. 1068); Tribal-State Compact,
Nez Perce Tribe-Idaho., § 6.4.3 (2002) (compact approved and published 68
Fed. Reg. 1068).
298
Idaho v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 2006);
Tribal-State Compact, Shoshone-Bannock Tribes-Idaho., §§ 13–14 (2000)
(compact approved and published 65 Fed. Reg. 54541–2).
299
Id. at 1102; see also Tribal-State Compact, Shoshone-Bannock Tribes-Idaho.,
§ 24(d) (2000) (compact approved and published 65 Fed. Reg. 54541–2).
300
Idaho v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d at 1102.
301
Id. at 1101.
302
Idaho has also agreed to pay the Nez Perce Tribe ten percent of all net
revenue taken from Idaho Lottery Sales on the Tribe’s Reservation. Tribal-State
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percentage of revenue of revenue that the Tribe must donate. The
State allows the tribe to decide where their revenue goes and does
not arbitrarily spend it at will. The tribe can steward its revenue and
donate it to purposes that benefit both the tribe and the neighboring
state citizens. Although Idaho requires that compacts do “not
obligate the state of Idaho to appropriate state funds” to the tribes,303
the State does appear to have taken the initiative in acknowledging
tribal economics and the inherent benefits gaming provides the
State.
The tribal gaming economy is estimated to draw over 500,000
people with sixty percent traveling from another state to Idaho. 304 In
2014, tribal gaming provided the tribes and Idaho with 3,361 jobs
accounting for over $81 million in wages and salaries. 305 Indeed,
gaming has allowed tribes to become large employers in their
respective regions and their willingness to employ state citizens
demonstrates a desire to maintain and build kinship relations. Even
though times of difficulty arise between the tribes and the State,306
their willingness to deal in good faith shines through. However, this
willingness is not absolute.
Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed a Senate bill that
repealed a law that allowed wagering on “historical” horse races at
Compact, Nez Perce Tribe-Idaho., § 6.1 (2008) (compact approved and
published 73 Fed. Reg. 58617).
303
IDAHO CODE § 67-429A(2)(b) (2014).
304
STEVEN PETERSON, TRIBAL ECONOMIC IMPACTS: THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
THE FIVE IDAHO TRIBES ON THE ECONOMY OF IDAHO 3 (summary ed., Julie Kane
& Darren Williams eds. 2015).
305
Id. at 5.
306
See generally Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 794 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir.
2015) (holding that despite Idaho’s uneven enforcement of prohibition on poker,
Texas Hold’em could not be considered a Class II game because it is prohibited
by Idaho law); Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. State, 842 F. Supp. 1268, 1282 (D. Idaho
1994) aff’d sub nom Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. State of Idaho, 51 F.3d 876 (9th
Cir. 1995). There, the Court determined that because lottery was a Class III
game in Idaho, the State could not conduct the game on the Nez Perce’s
reservation absent a compact and a tribal gaming ordinance. Id. Eventually in
2008, the Nez Perce and Idaho compacted to allow the Idaho lottery to be played
on the Tribe’s reservation because “it would be in their collective best interests.”
Tribal-State Compact, Nez Perce Tribe-Idaho., § 2.8 (2008). See also Knox v.
State ex rel. Otter, 223 P.3d, 266, 148 Idaho 324 (Idaho Sup. Ct. 2009) (holding
that even if video gaming was illegal under the Idaho Constitution, the United
States would probably not criminally prosecute the Tribe because the Ninth
Circuit found tribal video gaming as legal under Idaho compacts. (citing Idaho
v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 2006)).
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race tracks. 307 The Coeur d’Alene Tribe introduced the repeal bill
into the Idaho Legislature. 308 The bill passed through both houses of
the Idaho Legislature with “overwhelming numbers,” but the
Governor and Secretary of State refused to make the bill active
law. 309 The Governor also failed to veto the bill in accordance with
the Idaho Constitution. The Court ordered that the bill be made
formal law because of the Governor’s failure to veto it. 310 Despite
this wrinkle in relations between the tribes and the Governor, who
did not act to promote kinship relations, the tribes enjoy certainty in
knowing what their revenue is used for. The tribe stewards their
revenue for education on and near the reservation as they see fit.
Despite the Idaho Constitution’s ban on most Class III games, 311
any kinship-based economy requires both accommodation and
equivocal exchange. It appears that Idaho is far closer than most
states with revenue sharing agreements because of the State’s
willingness to allow tribes to act generously through and steward
their own revenue through donations. This approach benefits the
whole community and can further be the rational for the State to
again expand the games tribes can pursue for economic
development. Idaho employs one of the closest examples of a
cooperative federalism framework that incorporates tribal
economics.
D. No Consideration Found in Substantial Exclusivity
In the states analyzed, the commonality in substantial
exclusivity agreements appears to be that they are driven by greed
rather than the building of kinship relationships. With the exception
of Idaho, the states do not provide the tribes a voice on how gaming
revenue will be used. All states secure a portion of net revenue or
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define how a tribe can use revenue before the tribe can provide for
its members.
Tribal economics requires that a tribe exercises its inherent
sovereignty to the fullest extent. While each state discussed above
does compact with tribes, the state uses its superior bargaining
position to limit the scope of the tribe’s gaming. Through substantial
exclusivity arrangements, the state limits tribal sovereignty.
For example, New York allows the Seneca Nation to engage in
off-reservation gaming but will not allow the Tuscarora or
Tonawanda Seneca the same ability. The Tuscarora and
Tonawanda’s sovereignty is impeded upon. Oklahoma’s statutory
exclusivity is not the result of a tribe negotiating for a good faith
compact. Oklahoma provides a mere adhesion contract that denies
the tribe the ability to do best for its members. California requires
gaming tribes to subsidize non-gaming tribes through the RSTF and
the State through the SDF. The only thing tribes in California
receive is Constitutional protection that California voters can
rescind at any time. If that happens, tribes will be forced to decide
between abandoning their gaming enterprise or surrendering to the
remaining terms of the compact. California tribes are now dependent
on California citizens for gaming being a successful form of
economic development. Idaho, in contrast with the other States, does
lend more to an acknowledgment of inherent sovereignty. The State
allows the tribe to allocate funds as the tribe sees fit. However,
substantial exclusivity for Idaho tribes is defined on the Idaho
Constitution’s ban on casino gaming. 312 This does limit tribal
sovereignty because the tribe cannot operate gaming off the
reservation and the tribe is dependent on Idaho voters not rescinding
the Constitutional provision, albeit highly unlikely to occur.
Sovereignty is ignored because the tribe’s ability to continue Class
III gaming is contingent on the State’s actions in regards to the
substantial exclusivity provisions.
In tribal economics, good faith requires fair dealing and
equivocal exchange. 313 Good faith also requires acknowledgment of
the community’s needs, not just the individual. New York,
Oklahoma, and California each refuse to compact in good faith. New
312
313

Id.
EagleWoman, Tribal Nations and Tribalist Economics, supra note 14, at 836.
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York has caused the Seneca Nation to reject its kin in the
Tonawanda Seneca and Tuscarora Tribes. Although each tribe has
its own reservation land, the rejection of traditional kinship
networks demonstrates how New York’s dealings forces the tribe to
abandon the other tribes that are part of their community.
Oklahoma’s model compact goes further by preventing tribes from
acknowledging kin within the state by presenting a model compact
as an adhesion contract. There is no room for negotiation and the bar
on non-tribal gaming does not account for equivocal exchange.
California’s Constitutional provision for substantial exclusivity
does not provide a tribe anything as its illusory nature shows. The
revenue tribes are forced to contribute to the RSTF and SDF is not
an equivocal exchange. The lack of negotiation and accommodation
between these states and tribes is astounding but not surprising.
Idaho does attempt to promote good faith as seen through its
willingness to expand Class III games for tribes. Idaho also allows
tribes to account for their community by allowing the tribes to
determine whom it will gift its revenue to through donations.
Although not perfect, Idaho is attempting to act in good faith
through the cooperative federalism framework the IGRA is
supposed to present.
Stewardship of gaming revenue by the tribe is also absent in
revenue sharing for substantial exclusivity agreements in compacts
found in New York, Oklahoma, and California. New York’s forcing
of the Seneca Nation to provide substantial percentages of its net
drop does not allow the Tribe to determine how its revenue is spent.
Rather the State decides. Oklahoma does the same through its model
compact as does California through the RSTF and SDF. By refusing
the tribe to allocate its revenue as it sees fit, the tribe can become
disinclined to gift surplus revenue to the outside community and
other tribes. This is the error found in California’s SDF. No tribe
should be forced to subsidize other tribes unless the tribe itself wants
to better the whole community or reinforce traditional kinship
networks. Idaho does incentivize tribes to act for the betterment of
the whole community by allowing tribes to determine how its
revenue will be spent. This allows tribes in Idaho to steward its
resources and gift it as donations.
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As the illusory nature of substantial exclusivity demonstrates,
there simply is no consideration in these arrangements. This is
definitely true when analyzed through tribal economics. The
Secretary is charged with ensuring the trust relationship between the
United States and tribes is protected through 25 U.S.C. § 81.
However, the Secretary fails to do this by ratifying each tribal-state
compact. Trust is breached because of the Seminole decision’s
declaration that the good faith enforcement process is
unconstitutional. 314 That holding allows states to hold hostage tribes
who want to engage in Class III gaming. The only recourse for tribes
is to agree to revenue sharing for substantial exclusivity if the state
demands it. This demonstrates a lack of good faith because there is
no equivocal exchange nor is there fair dealing. The state acts
individualistically and greedily despite the tribe being part of the
state. This discourages gift giving and donation by tribes to the state
or other tribes. This erosion of traditional kinship networks is further
harmed by substantial exclusivity. Other tribes can become limited
in their ability to pursue Class III gaming if their land is within
another tribe’s range of exclusivity. This is what the Seneca
Nation’s compact illustrates. While the Tonawanda and Tuscarora
could engage in Class III gaming on their reservations, the tribes are
not able to expand off-reservation.
Substantial exclusivity tends to cause fragmentation rather than
fostering the creation and expansion of a kinship network that
incorporates all tribes and states. Once one tribe receives access to
games outside of the scope of the exclusive arrangement, other
tribes are quick require the same benefits at the expense of the other
tribes. The Shoshone-Bannock’s exploitation of Idaho’s good faith
attempt to expand Class III gaming exemplifies this. States know
their superior bargaining position and although they have multiple
socioeconomic reasons to consider the whole community, American
capitalism’s focus on profits tend to drive negotiations. The
Secretary merely rubber stamps compacts with substantial
exclusivity agreements with little substantive criticism. As shown,
these agreements do not have adequate consideration within a tribal
economy. Changes are needed to ensure tribes can pursue economic
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development with substantial exclusivity providing adequate
consideration within a tribal economy.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
If the IGRA is to be a stimulus for cooperative federalism, 315
states need to have limits placed on to them due to their superior
bargaining position. Action has to come from Congress, the
Department of the Interior, and tribes themselves because states
have shown little willingness to negotiate with tribes appropriately.
Because the IGRA allows revenue sharing and substantial
exclusivity agreements as a policy rationale, states tend to mask
greed through preemptive fears that socioeconomic conditions will
deteriorate in the area surrounding the reservation. 316 Limits on state
bargaining power need to account for tribal economics so gaming
tribes can include tribal forms of trade into negotiations. Through
the inclusion of kinship economics, compassion, and a willingness
to accommodate one another, states and tribes can overcome the
greed that currently underlies the compacts that purport to provide
substantial exclusivity.
First, Congress needs to amend the IGRA to limit what states can
do with net revenue generated by revenue sharing agreements.
Because states tend to see substantial exclusivity agreements as
gratuitous gifts, 317 tribes have an expectation of reciprocal gift
exchanges. The IGRA should require states to invest the funds on
the reservation land for infrastructure, communication, and
technological improvements. Funds should also be used to fund and
foster economic investment projects with the tribe and state citizens.
Such projects could either be funded through compact provisions
such as the Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s or state provided grants furnished
by funds received through revenue sharing. Not only would this
demonstrate a willingness to cooperate with each other as
sovereigns, the state would be able to reinvest the funds for what
they were designed to do, improve the reservation and surrounding
areas. These actions would foster the development of proper kinship
315
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relationships between all relevant parties because accommodation
would occur for the betterment of all persons involved. In other
words, it would create a community, not divided populations. This
would provide the tribes and the state a substantial economic benefit
and provide the adequate consideration that is currently not found in
substantial exclusivity.
Second, Congress needs to realize that substantial exclusivity
arrangements are illusory. Most agreements rest on the false notion
that the state suffers by allowing gaming on tribal lands especially
when the state does not circumvent any state law by compacting.
Substantial exclusivity has provided the states a method to force
tribes to bargain away their sovereignty. Before providing for tribal
members, the tribe is forced to provide an economic benefit derived
from a form of economic development oftentimes barred by state
law. Congress should either require tribes to ascertain what a proper
per capita payment would be for its members on a yearly basis to
assist in providing a suitable quality of life or estimate the amount
necessary for governmental investment for the development of the
reservation. In other words, Congress should require tribes to begin
stewarding revenue in anticipation of realizing the revenue. With
these estimates, the tribe can negotiate with the state what a proper
gift would be and further steward the funds to build a kinship
relationship with the state based on understanding. Accommodation
would occur because the revenue projections would allow the state
and tribe to negotiate what would be a reasonable contribution by
the tribe would be for state projects within and near the reservation.
This would stimulate cooperation between the sovereigns and
benefit all people affected positively and negatively by the gaming
enterprise.
Third, the Department of the Interior should institute regulations
that define a “substantial economic benefit.” Proper guidance when
compacting is inexistent because the Secretary looks to pleas by the
tribe and state that a benefit is included in a substantial exclusivity
provision, then either makes an ad hoc determination or ignores the
compact to implicitly approve it 45 days later. The regulations
would need to focus on the building of the community surrounding
the tribe and within the reservation. Granted, the Department is
hamstrung by the Seminole decision, but that does not mean that the
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states should be allowed to run rampant. The Secretary is required
to ensure that tribes are not subject to contracts where they are
forced to pay excessive fees for limited services. 318 Regulations that
actually define “substantial economic benefit” would provide
revenue sharing agreements consideration in a tribal economy and
benefit all parties.
Finally, tribes need to step up and become proactive at the
negotiating table and agree to directly assist the state. Not through
revenue sharing agreements, but through surplus funds. Granted, not
all tribes can contribute large amounts of money. The display of
good faith by the tribe, as exemplified by the Coeur d’Alene Tribe,
that a partnership does exist is what tribal economics is about. The
gift does not necessarily need to be substantial in relation to revenue
after fees and costs have been accounted for, but both sides need to
assist each other the best they can for a kinship economy to work.
This allows the true nature of tribal economics to be implemented
into cooperative federalism because the tribe’s generosity should
provide an imprint on the state. The state should then feel more
compelled to assist the tribe because at the end of the day, the tribe,
albeit sovereign, is part of the state’s community. The tribes need to
assist in expenditures in proportion to the inherent economic
benefits the state receives from gaming. It is apparent that at least
for the near future, revenue sharing agreements will continue. Yet,
the display of community through such gifts could compel the state
to actually give the tribe a substantial economic benefit in the form
of investment grants and opportunities to assist the whole
community.
VII. CONCLUSION
Substantial exclusivity agreements do not provide tribes
consideration either in traditional contract law or in tribal
economics. Substantial exclusivity has become a way to fractionate
tribes and the surrounding communities while providing an
economic windfall to the state. As the very first substantial
exclusivity provision between Connecticut and the Mashantucket
Pequot demonstrates, tribes are pitted against one another. In order
318
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for the Mohegan Tribe to pursue Class III gaming, Connecticut had
to rescind the Pequot’s exclusivity. The Shoshone-Bannock’s action
in getting the Ninth Circuit to declare the imposition of a five
percent donative requirement to engage in video gaming also
represents the systems flaws. Because the Nez Perce and Kootenai
Tribes agreed to the provision, the Shoshone-Bannock had no reason
to work for the betterment of the State and other Idaho tribes.
Although their actions demonstrate a rejection of tribal economics,
the compacting requirement has at least in part caused these actions.
With courts refusing to acknowledge the inherent duress tribes
endure in seeking to engage in self-determination, states are able to
continue bad faith negotiations when a substantial revenue source is
prime for the taking. The false premise that gaming makes tribes
immediately wealthy does not assist because it makes state citizens
pressure the state, that could be dealing with a decreasing budget, to
demand revenue sharing. This further erodes tribal economics
because the state’s position to create the best outcome for state
citizens comes at the tribe’s expense. Revenue sharing simply has
no basis in good faith nor equivocal exchange; it is a money grab.
Although some states, such as Idaho, have tried to find a middle
ground in allowing the tribe to allocate the funds as they see fit, New
York, Oklahoma, and California demonstrate that Idaho is the
exception, not the norm.
Revenue sharing hinders a tribe’s ability to reinvest its proceeds
and diversify its holdings for the betterment of the whole
community, not just the tribal members. Because of this, tribes are
reluctant and often are unable to be generous with earnings because
surplus funds are not being used to appease the states, net revenues
are. This harms the tribe’s ability to steward and protect its economy
because of the lack of community. The Seminole decision has forced
many tribes to depend on the state for protection and development
of its economy. This new form of dependency infringes on the very
core of tribal sovereignty because the tribe and the state are unable
to build a kinship relationship as the linking of arms between
brothers who are equal. Rather, conflict and greed ensnare the
compacting process and demonstrates how substantial exclusivity
does not provide tribes adequate consideration within a tribal
economy. Changes are needed and can only occur if Congress, the
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Secretary, states, and tribes step up to the plate to better each
respective community that is impacted by a tribal-state compact.

